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Abstract
Why do politicians redistribute resources through in-kind rather than cash transfers? This
paper examines political incentives for in-kind government redistribution. By analyzing the
political game between o¢ ce-motivated politicians and self-interested citizens, I rst show that
in economies with competitive markets in-kind transfers are not required. Politicians can win
elections targeting groups of voters with di¤erential cash transfers. However, in-kind transfers
arise in the presence of externalities in consumption. In that case, targeting groups of voters
with in-kind rather than cash transfers allows politicians to attract simultaneously voters in
additional groups with the same amount of resources. Politicians undertake political redistribu-
tion depending on the expected electoral returns obtained from targeting both cash and in-kind
transfers into di¤erent groups. Furthermore, electoral competition leads the economy to achieve
Pareto e¢ cient allocations that markets cannot reach. Politicians internalize the presence of
external e¤ects when competing for marginal voters who could swing their vote.
I am grateful for helpful comments from Alessandra Casella, Navin Kartik, Massimo Morelli, Patrick Bolton,
Yeon-Koo Che, Josepa Miquel-Florensa, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Bernard Salanié and seminar participants at Columbia
University.
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1 Introduction
In advanced democracies, governments raise taxes and redistribute resources on a large scale. Ev-
idence shows that a signicant part of this redistribution is undertaken through in-kind transfers
such as health services, education, housing or child and elderly care.1For instance, public health
care spending in 2008 represented on average 7% of GDP and 16% of government expenditures in
OECD countries. In the US, public spending in primary and secondary education stands at 5% of
GDP. Overall, in-kind transfers in the OECD represent around 15% of GDP.2Why do politicians
redistribute resources through in-kind rather than cash transfers? The goal of this paper is to
examine political incentives for in-kind government redistribution.
In particular, I investigate whether politicians who compete for o¢ ce need to make use of in-
kind transfers when there are no constraints in the available taxation policy tools. The common
view in political economy literature is that in-kind transfers emerge as an instrument to redistribute
resources across groups of citizens.3However, my rst main result shows that in-kind transfers are
not required when politicians can court groups of citizens with di¤erential cash transfers.
In order to analyze the political choice between cash and in-kind transfers, I consider a society
in which individuals belong to a nite number of groups. Citizens care about their available
income and the consumption of goods that might be subject to public provision such as health and
education. Through a political process, citizens have to elect a government who can raise taxes
to fund cash and in-kind transfers. There are no constraints in the available taxation policy that
government can use and economic policies are non-distortionary.
The government is elected from two o¢ ce-motivated political parties that compete for power.
Politicians credibly commit to a combination of net taxation policy and in-kind transfers targeted
to groups in order to maximize their chance of winning elections. Furthermore, each party holds
xed ideological positions non-related with economic policy such as positions on value issues. Cit-
izens have heterogeneous attachments toward those partiesideological views and share a common
valuation of the competing parties. Hence, each citizen votes for the party that maximizes her own
well-being given promised economic policies, ideological views and the valuation of political parties.
The party that obtains the majority of the votes wins the election and implements the announced
policies.
With the purpose of focusing the analysis on the distributional side, I assume the existence
of competitive rms that produce goods such as health care or education. In a market economy
without government intervention, the access to those goods depends on individuals income, but
1By in-kind transfers I refer to government expenditures intended to provide the consumption of specic goods,
regardless of whether production is public or private.
2Source: OECD Economic Outlook 2009 and OECD Health Data 2010; See Currie and Gahvari (2008) and Alesina
and Glaeser (2004) for a detailed discussion on that evidence.
3See for instance Epple and Romano (1996a,b), Gouveia (1997) and Currie and Gahvari (2008).
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the market allocation is not politically sustainable. Once electoral competition is introduced,
politicians have incentives to redistribute resources in order to win elections. The gainers of the
political process are the groups with lower initial amount of resources and homogeneous ideological
positions.
However, this does not imply that redistribution must occur through in-kind transfers. Politi-
cians compete for pivotal voters that could swing their vote but can court those swing voters by
targeting di¤erential cash transfers across groups of citizens. Hence, why is in-kind redistribution
so prevalent? Normative analysis justies in-kind transfers as optimal responses of a benevolent
planner to either market failures or equity concerns.4Currie and Gahvari (2008) survey normative
theoretical explanations for in-kind transfers and review limited empirical evidence. They consider
interdependent preferences such as externalities and paternalism as the leading candidates to ex-
plain governmentsuse of in-kind transfers.5I introduce this type of preferences into the distributive
politics game. In that situation, I nd that in-kind redistribution is politically necessary. Politicians
can attract more voters making use of in-kind rather than cash transfers. I focus on two particular
cases in order to analyze how political redistribution is a¤ected by interdependent preferences.
I rst discuss the role of in-kind transfers in the presence of consumption externalities. Speci-
cally, I explore the case in which the available health care coverage of the elderly generates a positive
externality for the rest of the population. In that case, politicians can court simultaneously swing
voters in all groups targeting in-kind transfers to the group whose consumption generates a posi-
tive external e¤ect. These political incentives lead the economy to increase the overall consumption
levels of the good subject to in-kind transfers.
I then explore how incentives for political redistribution are a¤ected by the presence of egalitar-
ian preferences on the consumption of specic commodities. For instance, individuals could believe
that health and education are fundamental rights. These rights should not be dependent on citi-
zensability to pay or any other circumstances. I show that politicians implement in-kind transfers
in order to reduce inequalities. However, an egalitarian distribution is not attainable because of
the political incentives for di¤erential treatment across groups. O¢ ce-motivated politicians exploit
individualsconcerns for their own economic well-being, courting voters with di¤erential in-kind
transfers. Those incentives also lead to decreasing aggregate consumption levels of goods subject
to egalitarian views.
An appealing result of my research is that the electoral competition for marginal voters exhausts
potential Pareto improvements in the economy. Politicians redistribute resources using available
4See Stiglitz (1995) and Rosen and Gayer (2010) for a textbook treatment of failures in markets for health and
education such as asymmetries of information, liquidity constraints or spillover e¤ects; Musgrave (1959) and Besley
(1988) for paternalistic motives on the individualslack of skills and myopia to make good choices on merit goods.
5Currie and Gahvari (2008) also discuss the extensive literature on the role of in-kind transfers as screening device
to redistribution in the presence of asymmetric information (Nichols and Zeckhauser,1982; Blackorby and Donaldson,
1988; Bruce and Waldman, 1991). However, they highlight the limited practical feasibility of such self-selection
mechanism.
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policy tools in such a manner that the allocation of resources that results from electoral com-
petition and individualsmarket decisions is Pareto e¢ cient. The e¢ ciency argument in electoral
competition was made informally by Wittman (1989, 1995). Furthermore, Besley and Coate (1998)
and Besley (2007) highlighted that e¢ ciency should be reached in static political economy models
without constraints in policy tools. The novelty of my contribution relies on showing that this
e¢ ciency result holds in the political choice of cash versus in-kind redistribution in the presence of
externalities and equity concerns. Politicians competing for marginal voters lead the economy to
achieve Pareto-e¢ cient allocations that markets cannot reach.
It is important to notice that this e¢ ciency result is not the choice of a benevolent planner that
implements in-kind transfers either to correct market imperfections or to satisfy equity concerns.
Instead, the e¢ cient allocation is the equilibrium outcome of the political game between politicians
and voters. The political process does not generate allocative ine¢ ciencies and the implemented
allocation in the Pareto set depends on the political clout of di¤erent groups.
One of the advantages of the present positive analysis over the normative one is that we do not
need to rely on value judgments on the weight of groups in society in order to characterize economic
policies. The characterization of redistributive schedules announced by politicians depends on the
political inuence of groups. Such an inuence is explained by the expected electoral returns
obtained from targeting both cash and in-kind transfers into di¤erent groups.
The model builds on previous work on probabilistic voting developed by Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) to study political redistribution of cash transfers across
groups of voters.6I extend that framework, allowing politicians to court groups of citizens with
both cash and in-kind transfers when market provision of the targeted goods is also feasible. By
exploiting a probabilistic voting model, this paper can tractably handle political equilibria with
multidimensional policy space without imposing severe constraints into policy tools. This model-
ing strategy allows me to show that previous results on the political use of in-kind transfers are
driven by policy constraints imposed in order to ensure the existence of equilibrium. Inuential con-
tributions such as Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), Epple and Romano (1996a,b) and Levy (2005)
rationalize the use of in-kind transfers as tool of political redistribution across groups of citizens.
Those transfers could emerge without the necessity of assuming market failures or equity concerns.
However, this paper shows that a pure redistributive motive does not explain the political use of
in-kind transfers once a su¢ ciently rich set of policy instruments is available.
Essential for my results is the possibility of allowing the targeting of in-kind transfers toward
groups of citizens. That form of targeting has been mainly ignored by both the literature on redis-
tributive politics and theoretical research on in-kind transfers. Those contributions have generally
assumed that politicians o¤er universal homogeneous provision of health and education. However,
6Those models were extended by Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Lizzeri and Persico (2004) to analyze the size
and scope of government spending.
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evidence supports the possibility of targeting in-kind transfers. The most obvious cases are the
Medicare and the Medicaid programs targeted to the elderly and the poor in the US. Furthermore,
even in systems of universal provision the coverage is not uniform. As an example, the co-payments
schedules in European public health systems depends on citizensage, level of income or employ-
ment status. Similarly, the exemptions of course fees in public universities are determined by family
income or geographic mobility. Hence, this paper opens the way to new empirical analysis on the
political targeting of in-kind transfers towards specic groups or constituencies.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I present the benchmark of a competitive
market allocation. Section III analyzes the role of in-kind transfers as a tool of political redistribu-
tion. Section IV introduces external e¤ects into the distributive politics game. Section V explores
political redistribution in the presence of equity concerns. Finally, the last section concludes and
discusses potential further research.
2 The Economy: Market Allocation
Consider an economy with a continuum of citizens whose measure can be normalized to 1. Citizens
are divided into a nite number of groups, j 2 f1; :::; Jg, with measure j . No group constitutes a
majority of the population. Each individual in group j has an endowment of wj units of a numeraire
good. This endowment can be thought as the level of income or money obtained by citizens of a
given occupation or type in a market economy. The total amount of resources in the economy is
dened as:
w =
JX
j=1
jwj (1)
Competitive rms produce health services at di¤erent quality levels, h,7 using a linear technol-
ogy that requires qh units of the numeraire commodity to produce one unit of health services at
quality h. All individuals in the population have the same preferences over the consumption of the
numeraire commodity, c, and health care quality, h, represented by the following utility function:
U j(cj ; hj) = u(cj ; hj) 8j (2)
This function is continuous, twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing (uc > 0; uh > 0) and strictly
concave (ucc < 0, uhh < 0) in c and h. Marginal utilities are bounded away from 0 and uc(0; h) =1
and uh(c; 0) =1. There are no complementarities between health quality and the numeraire (i.e.
uch = 0) and both commodities are assumed to be normal goods.
I assume perfectly competitive markets.8Firms with constant returns to scale produce whatever
quality of health care that citizens demand at price, ph, equal to marginal cost, q. Competitive
7For expositional reasons, I focus on health care but the analysis is also valid for education.
8 I abstract away potential market imperfections such as asymmetries of information and imperfect competition.
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rms make zero prots. Citizens endowed with available resources, wj , purchase in competitive
markets the quality of health care that they desire at market price ph. The residual amount of
resources is left for consumption of the numeraire commodity. Thus, individuals budget constraint
is given by:
wj = cj + phh
j (3)
The choice problem for individual i located in group j who acquires health services in the market
is dened as follows:
8i 2 j max
hj
U j(cj ; hj) = u(wj   phhj ; hj) s.t. hj  0 (4)
where the FOCs for an interior optimum are:
[hj ]   phuc + uh = 0! uh = phuc 8j (5)
The optimal market choice, (cjm ; hjm) 8j, for individuals with initial endowment wj , satises (5)
such that:
uh(c
j
m ; h
j
m) = phuc(c
j
m ; h
j
m) 8j (6)
From this relation, we can implicitly dene the marshallian demand functions for health care
quality and numeraire commodity:
hjm = h
j
m(w
j ; ph) 8j (7)
cjm = c
j
m(w
j ; ph) 8j (8)
Denition (Market Allocation): A competitive market equilibrium is an allocation of numeraire
commodity and health services quality for each group of the polity, fcjm ; hjmgJj=1, such that con-
sumers solve problem (4); and competitive rms with constant returns to scale produce whatever
amount citizens demand at price ph, equal marginal cost, q. In equilibrium, economy feasibility
constraint holds with equality:
JX
j=1
jcjm +
JX
j=1
jphh
j
m = w (9)
In a competitive equilibrium, the rate at which consumers are willing to trade health services
for numeraire commodity, MRSh;c, is equal for all individuals and equal to the rate at which
the economy is able to transform numeraire into health care quality, MRTh;c. Therefore, Market
allocation is Pareto Optimal.
This assumption is made in order to focus the analysis on the distributional side. i.e. how di¤erences of available
income a¤ect access to health care quality.
6
MRSjh;c =MRTh;c = q 8 j 2 f1; :::; Jg (10)
Market equilibrium yields an allocation of resources such that individuals who belong to groups
with larger amount of initial endowment choose higher quality of health services and consume larger
amounts of numeraire good than individuals who belong to groups associated to low initial endow-
ments. This folllows directly from assumptions about homogeneity of preferences and normality of
both goods. Is this market allocation politically sustainable?
3 The Polity: Political Allocation
3.1 Political Game
The initial distribution of the endowment across groups can be modied by public intervention.
Through a political process the polity has to choose a government who can raise taxes and devote
these scal revenues to redistribute resources through both cash (i.e. numeraire) transfers and the
public provision of health services. Public provision is modeled as conditional transfers. Citizens
receive non-tradable transfers that can be uniquely spent to purchase health services in markets.9I
do not impose any constraint on the taxation schedule that government can use and economic
policies are non-distortionary.10
There are two purely o¢ ce-motivated political parties, P 2 fA;Bg, competing for o¢ ce. Hence,
parties announce taxation policy and in-kind transfers to each group j in order to maximize their
chances of winning elections. I assume majority voting, therefore winning corresponds to obtaining
the support of more than fty percent of the population. Voting is costless and nobody abstains.
Let yjP denote the amount of numeraire commodity promised by party P to group j. This net
income is the result of taxation policy targeted to j by P . Furthermore, politicians can announce
group-specic in-kind transfers. Let hjgP be the publicly provided quality of health care promised
by P . The marginal cost of the public funding of health services quality is equal to the market price,
ph. Politicians can credibly commit to a policy platform xP = fyjP ; hjgP gJj=1 to be implemented if
party P wins the elections. The allocation of resources after government intervention must satisfy
economic feasibility:
JX
j=1
jyjP +
JX
j=1
jphh
j
gP = w (11)
9As an alternative, I could assume that governments can directly produce these services with exactly the same
technology available to the private sector. In that case, results in terms of allocations of resources would be the same.
10Formally, those assumptions imply that governments are able to tax away all the initial endowment of resources.
Then, politicians redistribute that xed budget across groups allocating cash and in-kind transfers. See Lizzeri and
Persico (2004) for a close approach in economies with cash transfers and pure public goods.
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This constraint denes a budget set of private and public spending allocations that are feasible.
The policy set of available and attainable policies that captures all restictions, X  R2J , is non-
empty, convex and compact.
Citizens care about their own economic well-being represented by preferences (2) and have access
to health care markets. Once one of the parties P wins the elections and implements announced
policies, individuals are able to purchase health services, hjmP , at price ph. The overall quality of
health services in group j under government P would be the sum of the public and private provision,
hjP = h
j
gP + h
j
mP . The residual amount of available resources are allocated to the consumption of
numeraire commodity, cjmP = y
j
P   phhjmP .
In addition to economic policy, citizens care about non-economic issues. Specically, I adopt a
partisanship probabilistic voting model.11 Political parties hold xed and di¤erentiated positions
in some dimension other than economic policy. For instance, parties A and B could represent
respectively conservative and liberal positions on value issues (e.g. pro-life versus pro-choice views),
foreign policy or the role of religion in public life. Individuals have biases toward those parties
ideological views. Dene i as the relative attachment that individual i has to party Bs positions
(i.e. i = iB   iA). This ideological bias can be positive or negative.
Parties do not know the party attachment of each individual. However, the group-specic
distribution of relative ideological biases for each group is common-knowledge. I assume that the
idiosyncratic biases for citizens in group j are drawn from a uniform distribution over the range
[ja; 
j
b]:
i  U

  1
2j
+ j ;
1
2j
+ j

8i 2 j (12)
Groups might di¤er with respect to both their average ideological bias, j = (ja + 
j
b)=2, and
the ideological homogeneity within the group. Groups with a broader support of party biases (i.e.
greater ideological dispersion) have a lower density j = 1=(jb   ja). Denote  =
PJ
j=1 
jj
the weighted average of ideological heterogeneity across groups. In spite of bias diversity within
and across groups, I assume that there is no aggregate ideological bias in the overall population.
Furthermore, there are ideologically neutral voters, i = 0, in all groups.
Citizens value the personal attributes of the politicians running in the elections. I assume that
between the announcement of cash and in-kind policies and elections each party receives aggregate
shocks, "A and "B, common to all voters in the population. I normalize the common shock, " =
"B   "A, which measures the perception that voters have on party Bs candidate with respect to
candidate A at the time of elections (i.e. average relative popularity of candidate B). I assume that
11 I use the specication of individuals concerns on non-economic ideological issues and popularity of political parties
proposed by Persson and Tabellini (1999). See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a detailed discussion.
8
the common shock " is uniformly distributed, independently from i; with density  and expected
value, E("), equal to 0.
"  U [  1
2 
;
1
2 
] (13)
The timing of the political game is as follows: 1) Political parties simultaneously and non-
cooperatively credibly commit to their economic policy platforms, xA = fyjA; hjgAgJj=1 and xB =
fyjB; hjgBgJj=1. 2) The random idiosyncratic, i, and common popularity shocks, ", are realized.
3) Citizens vote for the candidate that they prefer, fA;Bg. 4) Whichever party P that obtains
the majority of the votes, wins the election and implements the economic policy promised at the
beginning of the game. Finally, 5) individuals make consumption choices through competitive
markets, fcjmP ; hjmP gJj=1.
3.2 Stages of the Game
The political game presented above has three stages:
Stage 1 - Policy Announcements: taking its opponents policy platfom as given, each party
chooses the net taxation policy and in-kind transfers for each social group that are economically
feasible and maximize its chances of winning elections. Parties take into account expected voting
decisions of citizens, knowing that they can supplement health services quality in competitive
markets.
Stage 2 - Elections: citizens vote for the party that they prefer given economic policy an-
nouncements, their ideological biases and the popularity of politicians.
Stage 3 - Market Decisions: once one of the parties wins the election and implements
announced policies, individuals make market choices. Individuals can make private purchases of
health care with their available income.
I characterize the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium of the political game by backward induc-
tion.
3.2.1 Third Stage: Market Decisions
In the last stage of the game, given implemented policies by winner party P , fyjP ; hjgP gJj=1, indi-
viduals decide whether to purchase health services through competitive markets, fhjmP gJj=1  0.
The residual available resources are allocated to the consumption of the numeraire commodity,
fcjmP gJj=1.
Individuals budget constraint in group j under Ps government is given by:
yjP = c
j
mP + phh
j
mP 8j (14)
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Consumer i 2 js choice problem can be written as:
max
hjmP
U j(cj ; hj) = u(yjP   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) s.t. hjmP  0 8j (15)
The FOCs for a maximum are given by:
[hjmP ] uh + 
j
h = phuc 8j (16)
jhh
j
mP = 0 ; 
j
h  0 8j (17)
where jh is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the non-negativity constraint, h
j
mP  0. The
choice problem for group j yields two alternatives. In the rst alternative, individuals decide not
to make private purchases of health care, hjmP = 0, if and only if this condition holds:
uh(y
j
P ; h
j
gP )  phuc(yjP ; hjgP ) 8j (18)
Given group js available income, yjP , the quality of publicly provided health services to this
group, hjgP , is such that the marginal benet of acquiring one unit of health care is lower than the
marginal cost in terms of lower consumption of numeraire commodity. Individuals do not purchase
private coverage and net income is fully devoted to the consumption of the numeraire commodity,
cjmP = y
j
P . Hence, the indirect utility function for groups that do not supplement (NS) public
health coverage under Ps government is given by:
V jNSP (y
j
P ; h
j
gP ; ph) = u(y
j
P ; h
j
gP ) 8j and 8 P 2 fA;Bg (19)
Otherwise, when the sign of condition (18) is reversed, individuals make private purchases,
hjmP > 0. The optimality condition of consumers choice problem yields:
uh(y
j
P   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) = phuc(yjP   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) 8j (20)
This condition implicitly denes the ordinary demand function of health services quality for
group j under Ps government, hjmP = h
j
m(y
j
P ; h
j
gP ; ph) 8j. Using individual budget constraint
(14), the consumption of numeraire commodity is dened as:
cjmP = y
j
P   phhjm(yjP ; hjgP ; ph) 8j (21)
The indirect utility function for groups that make private purchases (S) under Ps government
is given by:
V jSP (y
j
P ; h
j
gP ; ph) = u(y
j
P   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) 8j and 8 P 2 fA;Bg (22)
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3.2.2 Second Stage: Voting
At the voting stage, individuals consider announced policies, xA and xB, credible commitments that
parties implement if they win elections. Citizens value promised policies according to the impact on
their own economic well-being. Individuals take into account that they will be able to make private
decisions on health care markets once policies had been implemented. Thus, individuals valuation
of policies are summarized by either indirect utility function (22) or (19) depending whether they
supplement or not the quality of health care publicly provided.
Suppose that a member of group j is promised economic policies (yjA; h
j
gA) by party A and
(yjB; h
j
gB) by B. Given ideological biases and the popularity of politicians, citizen i in group j votes
for party A if:
V jA(y
j
A; h
j
gA) > V
j
B(y
j
B; h
j
gB) + i + " (23)
where V jP = maxfV jSP ; V jNSP gJj=1 8j and for P 2 fA;Bg. While voting for party B if this
inequality is reversed.
In each social group will be citizens with an idiosyncratic ideological bias, j , such that they
are indi¤erent between voting for party A or B. The swing voter type in each group j is dened
as:
j = V jA(y
j
A; h
j
gA)  V jB(yjB; hjgB)  " (24)
where V jP = maxfV jSP ; V jNSP gJj=1 8j for P 2 fA;Bg. Voters located in group j with and ideolog-
ical type i below (above) the cut-o¤ ideological type nd optimal to vote for A (B). Previously,
I assumed that the idiosyncratic ideological preferences are uniformly distributed in each group.
Furthermore, there is no ideological bias to any of the parties in the overall population. Therefore,
the overall vote share for party A is dened as:
SA(xA; xB; ") =
1
2
+
JX
j=1
jjj (25)
The complement share of citizens votes for party B, SB.
3.2.3 First Stage: Policy Announcements
At the rst stage of the game, when politicians announce policy platforms, the common shock has
not been observed. The swing voter type in each group depends on both policy platforms and the
realized value of the shock, j = j(xA; xB; "). Hence, parties are uncertain about the location of
the ideological cut-o¤ type in each group and voting is a random variable from politicianspoint of
view. I assumed majority voting, therefore o¢ ce-motivated politicians care about the probability
of obtaining more than fty per cent of the total vote. Given the swing voter type in each group
11
(24) and distributional assumptions on biases and shock, the probability that party A wins the
election can be expressed as:
P (xA; xB) =
1
2
+
 

24 JX
j=1
jj
h
V jA(y
j
A; h
j
gA)  V jB(yjB; hjgB)
i35 (26)
Party B anticipates winning the election with the complementary probability 1   P (xA; xB).
This function captures the uncertainty regarding electoral outcome and summarizes expected voting
behavior of citizens given announced policies and implied market decisions. The probability is a
function of the weighted average of di¤erences in indirect utility due to partiesproposals of cash
transfers and provision of health services. The weights depend on the heterogeneity of ideological
biases within a group.12
Probabilistic voting provides continuity of the probability function. Continuity of both individu-
alsutility function and distribution of ideological biases insures continuity in both policy platforms
of the probability that A wins the election. Furthermore, I assumed concavity of citizensutility
functions and uniform distribution of idiosyncratic ideological positions. Given these assumptions,
the probability function is quasi-concave in xP for each party P .13
Taking the opponents economic policies as given, each political party chooses a combination of
available income and public provision of health care for each group, fyjP ; hjgP gJj=1 for P 2 fA;Bg,
that maximizes its chances of winning elections subject to economic feasibility and non-negativity
constraints. Parties take into account citizensexpected voting decisions (stage 2 ) and individuals
choices in competitive markets (stage 3 ).
The policy choice problem of party A is given by:
max
fyjA;hjgAgJj=1
P (xA; xB) s.t. (11) and y
j
A  0 8j ; hjgA  0 8j (27)
The policy choice problem is symmetric to political party B. The First Order Conditions for
both political parties P 2 fA;Bg are dened as:
[yj ]
 

jj
dV jP (y
j
P ; h
j
gP )
dyj
+ jjyP = 
jP 8j (28)
[hjg]
 

jj
dV jP (y
j
P ; h
j
gP )
dhjg
+ jjhP = ph
jP 8j (29)
12See Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a detailed discussion on the properties of probability of winning functions
in this kind of electoral competition models.
13Austen-Smith and Banks (2005) and Banks and Duggan (2006) present excellent surveys on probabilistic voting
with o¢ ce-motivated politicians. Specially relevant are their technical discussion on continuity and quasiconcavity of
partiesprobability of winning elections.
12
P
24w   JX
j=1
jyjP  
JX
j=1
jphh
j
gP
35 = 0 (30)
jyP y
j
P = 0 8j ; jhPhjgP = 0 8j (31)
P  0 jyP  0 8j ; jhP  0 8j (32)
where jyP and 
j
hP are the multipliers associated to the non-negativity constraints y
j
P  0 and
hjgP  0 for all groups j 2 f1; :::; Jg for P 2 fA;Bg;and P is the Lagrange multiplier associated
to the economy feasibility constraint for P 2 fA;Bg.
3.3 Political Equilibrium
Denition: A Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in the probabilistic electoral com-
petition game is i) a menu of economic policies announced by each political party P , xNP =
fyjNP ; hjNgP gJj=1; ii) a voting decision for each individual of the polity, fA;Bg; and iii) individu-
alsprivate choices through competitive markets under Ps government, fcjNmP ; hjNmP gJj=1, such that:
1) Each political party announces a policy proposal that maximizes its chances of winning
elections taking as given its opponentspolicy announcements, the economy feasibility constraint
and citizensexpected voting and market decisions.
2) Each citizen votes for the party that maximizes her own well-being given announced
economic policies, ideological biases, popularity shock and decisions in competitive markets.
3) Each individual, given implemented policies, chooses the bundle of numeraire commodity
and health services that maximizes her utility given her available resources.
Proposition 1 (Existence) A SPNE in pure strategies exists.
Proof. Given that i) the feasible set of strategies for both political parties is non-empty, compact
and convex; and ii) candidates objective functions are continuous in policy strategies (xA; xB) and
quasiconcave in xA; xB for each party respectively. Furthermore, given that i) individualsbudget
set is also non-empty, compact and convex; and ii) citizensutility functions are assumed to be
continuous and concave in both goods. Then, according to Glicksbergs Theorem, there does exist
a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies.
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3.3.1 Political Allocation
Solving backwards, I characterize the Political Equilibrium of the game.14For both political parties,
the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers policies for any group j, (yjNP ; h
jN
gP ) , must satisfy:
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8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg, such that economic feasibility holds. In the pre-election stage,
politicians announce policies such that the marginal benet of targeting one unit of in-kind transfers
in terms of probability of winning elections is equal to the marginal opportunity cost. That cost is
measured by the marginal decrease in probability due to a reduction of targeted net income by ph
units.
The presence of competitive markets allows the existence of multiple equilibrium policies for
each group j. In the pre-election stage, politicians take into account that in the post-election stage
individuals have access to health care markets. In equilibrium, both political parties are indi¤erent
to announce di¤erent combinations of net taxation policy and in-kind transfers for each social group
j. However, the targeted consumption bundle of numeraire and health care to group j is the same
regardless of the choosen equilibrium policy. In equilibrium:
uh(c
jN
P ; h
jN
P ) = phuc(c
jN
P ; h
jN
P ) (34)
where cjNP = y
jN
P   phhjNmP and hjNP = hjNgP + hjNmP 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and P 2 fA;Bg.
The combination of choosen policies, fyjNP ; hjNgP gJj=1, imply consumption bundles for all groups
that satisfy the economy feasibility constraint. That set of bundles, fcjNP ; hjNP gJj=1, is the one that
maximizes politicianschances of winning elections given expected voting, competitive equilibrium
behavior of citizens and economic feasibility.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium Policies) Politicians are indi¤erent between announcing pure pri-
vate provision, pure public provision or a combination of public and private provision of health
services for each group j such that the consumption bundle intended for the groups is reached and
economic feasibility holds.
Corollary 3 (In-kind transfers not necessary) O¢ ce-motivated politicians need not resort to
in-kind transfers to win elections.
The existence of competitive markets allows any consumption bundle to be reached targeting
di¤erential cash transfers. That result contrasts with previous signicant political economy contri-
butions such as Fernandez and Rogerson (1995), Epple and Romano (1996a,b) and Gouveia (1997).
14See Mathematical Appendix A for a detailed discussion and complete characterization of the political equilibrium
and the propositions presented in this subsection.
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In that literature, in-kind transfers emerge as the political instrument to redistribute resources
across groups of voters. However, those results are driven by severe policy constraints imposed
in order to ensure the existence of political equilibrium. Specically, those models do not allow
the possibility of income redistribution. Therefore, those insights cannot be generalized when cash
transfers are allowed.
One exception in the literature is Levy (2005) who analyzes the possibility of in-kind transfers
when income redistribution is also feasible. In the presence of heterogeneous preferences, public
provision of education (i.e. in-kind transfers) could emerge as the result of a coalition between
the rich and the young poor. Nevertheless, in that case, in-kind redistribution arises because cash
transfers are constrained to be uniform for all the population.
In order to overcome the limitations imposed by modeling constraints, I introduce a probabilistic
voting model in the policy choice between cash and in-kind transfers. That allows relaxing the
constraints in policy tools allowing for di¤erential targeting cash and in-kind transfers. I show that
when there are no severe constraints in redistributive schedules, in-kind transfers are possible but
not politically necessary.
In the pre-election stage, political parties could announce di¤erent combinations of net taxation
and in-kind transfers policies. Then, policy divergence is possible. However, o¢ ce-motivated politi-
cians propose economic policies that implement the same allocation of resources once individuals
make private choices in competitive markets, fcjN ; hjNgJj=1:
cjN = cjNA = c
jN
B and h
jN = hjNA = h
jN
B 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg (35)
Proposition 4 (Political Allocation) The political game between o¢ ce-motivated politicians and
self-interested citizens yields to a unique consumption bundle of numeraire commodity and health
services for each group, fcjN ; hjNgJj=1:
3.3.2 Distributive Politics
In equilibrium, parties announce economic policies such that ideologically neutral voters (i = 0)
are expected to be indi¤erent between political parties. Hence, politicians compete in each group
for pivotal indi¤erent voters that could swing their vote. The electoral competition between o¢ ce-
motivated politicians leads to the consumption patterns of numeraire and health care across groups
implicitly dened by the following equations:
kuc(c
kN ; hkN ) = k
0
uc(c
k0N ; hk
0N ) 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (36)
kuh(c
kN ; hkN ) = k
0
uh(c
k0N ; hk
0N ) 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (37)
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The relative treatment across groups depends on both the concentration of expected swing
voters and the sensitivity of the expected ideological cut-point (24) to policy proposals. Those
incentives for political redistribution are consistent with the well-known insights on distributive
politics highlighted by Lindbeck and Weibull (1997) and Dixit and Londregan (1996) who analyze
the political allocation of cash transfers across groups. I extend those results allowing for di¤erential
targeting of commodities when market provision is feasible.
Proposition 5 (Swing Voters) The group-specic consumption bundle of numeraire and health
care that results from the political process is monotonically increasing in the density of expected
swing voters in each group.
Proof. Given the assumption of homogeneity of preferences and concavity of utility function,
equilibrium conditions hold if and only if groups with larger densities have lower marginal utility of
both numeraire and health services. Therefore, these groups must have larger allocations of both
commodities.
if k > k
0 ! uc(ckN ; hkN ) < uc(ck0N ; hk0N )! ckN > ck0N (38)
if k > k
0 ! uh(ckN ; hkN ) < uh(ck0N ; hk0N )! hkN > hk0N (39)
The density of the distribution of ideological biases, j , measures the ideological heterogeneity
within a group. That density captures the expected concentration of marginal voters in the group.
Therefore, the political success of a group depends on its degree of ideological homogeneity with
respect to the rest of the groups.
Corollary 6 (Homogeneous Biases) Ideologically homogeneous groups consume more numeraire
and health services than groups with larger diversity in ideological biases.
The political process penalizes groups with more dispersed ideological views. Those groups
present a lower concentration of marginal voters who could change their party attachment by
partieseconomic promises. Instead, groups with more homogenous views and larger concentration
of citizens in the expected cut-point receive larger benets.15In the particular case in which all
the groups had the same dispersion of ideological biases, the political game yields the utilitarian
allocation. That result holds because the expected marginal returns of targeting are identical across
groups.
Claim 7 (Utilitarian Allocation) When social groups have the same extent of ideological het-
erogeneity, o¢ ce-motivated politicians announce policies that implement the utilitarian allocation.
This allocation implies an egalitarian distribution of numeraire and health care for all individuals
of the polity.
15See Lizzeri and Persico (2004) for a close discussion on the e¤ect of ideological heterogeneity in the distribution
of cash transfers across groups.
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Political incentives to discriminate across groups also depend on the sensitivity of the expected
cut-point to policy platforms. Di¤erentiating (24) with respect to both policy alternatives, we can
notice the relation between expected electoral returns and convexity of preferences. The expected
electoral gain is inversely related with the curvature of the utility function over goods.
For instance, I could suppose the case in which the curvature over the consumption of numeraire
is lower than over health care (i.e. the marginal utility decreases faster when individuals increase
health care quality than when receive cash transfers). In that case, citizenswillingness to com-
promise their attachments to political parties falls quicker with increased targeting of health care.
This implies that one unit of resources devoted to health care is expected to generate lower electoral
returns that one unit targeted to the numeraire. Hence, in this case, opportunistic politicians have
incentives to announce policies that increase the consumption of numeraire because of its larger
electoral impact.
Furthermore, the marginal electoral returns of di¤erential targeting health care are lower than
the returns from discrimination through cash transfers across groups. On the one hand, with risk
aversion over health care, politicians can court swing voters by o¤ering lower amount of resources.
On the other hand, pivotal voters remain sensitive to larger o¤ers of cash transfers. Hence, the
political process would generate lower inequalities in the consumption of health care than in the
numeraire commodity.
Claim 8 The larger the curvature over the consumption of a good is, the lower the groupsdi¤er-
ences in the consumption of that good regardless of their expected concentration of swing voters.
3.3.3 Allocative E¢ ciency
The allocation of resources that results from the political process, fcjN ; hjNgJj=1, is such that the
rate at which consumers are willing to trade health care quality for numeraire commodity is equal
across groups and equal to the rate at which the economy is able to transform numeraire into health
care:
MRSjNh;c =MRTh;c = q 8j and P 2 fA;Bg (40)
Proposition 9 (E¢ ciency) The electoral competition game between o¢ ce-motivated politicians
who court self-interested citizens leads the economy to reach a Pareto E¢ cient allocation.
Hence, the political process does not generate allocative ine¢ ciencies. As highlighted by
Wittman (1989, 1995) that result illustrates an important feature of the competition between
politicians who strive to be elected. In the probabilistic electoral competition game, if one party
promises policies such that swing voters in one group could be made better o¤ without making
critical voters in other group worse o¤, the opponent party could announce policies that Pareto
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dominates its policy platforms. Therefore, when politicians compete for marginal voters they have
incentives to exhaust the potential Pareto improvements in order to win the elections.
This e¢ ciency result contrasts with signicant political economy contributions which viewed in-
kind transfers as the distortionary result of political redistribution. For instance, Epple and Romano
(1996a) state that if in-kind transfers are purely a consequence of the redistributive motive, then
the equilibrium allocation of goods is Pareto ine¢ cient. However, that ine¢ ciency arises because of
the restrictions on the technology of taxation but not by the political process. Once I remove these
constraints allowing for di¤erential targeting of cash and in-kind transfers, allocative ine¢ ciencies
disappear. This result is consistent with Besley and Coate (1998) and Besley (2007) critique to the
common claims about ine¢ ciency of political equilibria in static settings. Ine¢ ciencies would be
due to the imposed modeling constraints in order to get existence of equilibrium. In static political
economy models without constraints in policy tools e¢ ciency should be reached.16
Furthermore, Persson and Tabellini (2000) highlight that the system of equations that gives
equilibrium policies in partisanship probabilistic voting games corresponds to the solution of the
maximization of a weighted utilitarian social welfare function (SWF). Therefore, in those settings,
political equilibrium allocations would be Pareto optimal. Nevertheless, it is relevant to be clear
on the signicant di¤erences between the normative approach that sustains the existence of a
SWF and probabilistic voting. On the one hand, the SWF embodies ad hoc distributional value
judgments on how society should weight the utility of di¤erent social groups (Sen, 1977). On the
other hand, probabilistic voting takes a positive approach. The weights of groups depend on their
political inuence. Those weights determine equilibrium policies which do not generate allocative
ine¢ ciencies but modify the distribution of real resources across groups with respect to market
allocation.17
3.3.4 Market versus Political Allocation
In the previous section, I assumed competitive markets abstracting potential imperfections in order
to focus the analysis on the distributional side. I discussed that, in a market economy without
government intervention, the access to health care depends on individualsavailable income. Is this
market allocation sustainable in a political process?
Proposition 10 (Market Sustainability) O¢ ce-motivated politicians announce policies that im-
plement the market allocation of goods if and only if both i) the initial endowment of resources is
the same for all individuals; and ii) ideological polarization is equal across groups.
Proof. i) if groups are not endowed with the same amount of resources, due to concavity of
utility function, candidates can increase their expected number of votes targeting resources toward
16 Ine¢ ciencies in representative democracies could be introduced through other sources such as commitment prob-
lems and the strategic use of policy in dynamic settings (Besley and Coate, 1998, and Acemoglu, 2003).
17See Besley and Preston (2007) and Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010) for probabilistic voting models with empirical
work that measures groupsinuence on policy depending on individualsattachments to parties.
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groups with an initial higher marginal utility (i.e. lower initial endowment); ii) if the dispersion of
ideological biases is not homogeneous across social groups, politicians can increase their chances of
winning elections targeting more resources toward groups with larger ideological heterogeneity (i.e.
higher concentration of swing voters).
Hence, this paper points out that even in the case that markets work properly, market allocation
is not politically sustainable. In the presence of initial economic or ideological heterogeneity across
groups, o¢ ce-motivated politicians have incentives to redistribute resources. The gainers of the
political process are the groups with lower initial amount of resources and homogeneous ideological
positions.
4 External E¤ects
In view of the results outlined above, when citizens only care about their own economic well-
being, o¢ ce-motivated politicians could win elections without promising in-kind transfers. However,
evidence shows that elected politicians steadily redistribute resources through in-kind transfers on
a large scale.
Normative analysis in public economics has suggested interdependent preferences as one of the
leading candidates to explain the use of in-kind transfers. Particularly, literature has highlighted the
potential externalities generated by the consumption of health and education.18 In the normative
literature, in-kind transfers emerge as the optimal response of a benevolent government that correct
those market imperfections.
However, does this result hold in the presence of o¢ ce-motivated politicians that compete for
voters in elections? Individuals could feel better o¤ when their fellow citizens have access to health
and education. Nevertheless, government programs need to be funded and resources are scarce.
Then, to what extend are citizens willing to pay more taxes (or receive less cash transfers) in
order to fund external e¤ects? And most importantly, who must support the cost of funding those
externalities?
I focus on a particular case in order to analyze whether the political game internalizes the
presence of externalities. Specically, I explore the case in which the available health care coverage
of the elderly generates a positive externality for the rest of the population. This concern could be
motivated by pure altruism between generations. As an alternative, it could be justied by social
insurance motives. Individuals care about how society guarantees the access to health services to
the elderly.19
18See Stiglitz (1995) and Rosen and Gayer (2010) for a textbook treatment on the spillover e¤ects of education or
the positive externalities due to the consumption of health care. Currie and Gahvari (2008) highlight justications
based on interdependent preferences and paternalism. They also survey alternative explanations such as the role
of in-kind transfers to increase the e¢ ciency of the taxation system; and its potential use as screening device to
redistribute towards the needy.
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Regardless of the empirical relevance of this particular case, the goal of this section is to analyze
how incentives for political redistribution are a¤ected by the presence of consumption externalities.
4.1 Distributive Politics with Externalities
Consider an economy composed of three social groups: the workers, L, the enterpreneurs, F , and
the elderly, E. Each individual located in group j 2 fL;F;Eg is endowed with wj units of the
numeraire commodity. O¢ ce-motivated politicians compete for o¢ ce targeting both group-specic
net taxation policy and in-kind transfers. The selected combination of policies, fyjP ; hjgP gJj=1, must
be feasible (11) and citizens have access to competitive health care markets.
Preferences for the elderly are well-represented by the utility function (2) whose properties were
discussed in section II. However, now elderlys consumption of health services, hE , is a positive
externality for the workers and the enterpreneurs. The preferences for non-elderly citizens, k 2
fL;Fg, are represented by an utility separable in own-group consumption of goods and elderlys
health care. Let k denote the salience that captures groups relative weight between both concerns.
The larger the magnitude of the salience is, the greater the external e¤ect.
Uk(ck; hk; hE) = u(ck; hk) + kv(hE) 8k 2 fL;Fg (41)
The rst component measures utility derived from group ks own economic well-being. The
function u() is well-behaved. The second component captures the external e¤ects. Citizens in
group k value Es health care quality according to v(). I assume that this function is continuous,
twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave in hE .
vhE > 0 and vhEhE < 0 (42)
4.1.1 Political Allocation
Solving backwards, I characterize the Political Equilibrium of the game.20 For both political parties,
the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers policies for any group k, (ykNP ; h
kN
gP ), satisfy
the same equilibrium conditions than in an economy without external e¤ects. However, now the
equilibrium policies for group E must satisfy:
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19The elderly are the big consumers of health care in the OECD countries. Increases in both life expectancy and
cost of treatments due to new technologies explain observed signicant increases in health care spending. Source:
OECD Health Data 2010.
20See Mathematical Appendix B for a detailed discussion and complete characterization of the political equilibrium
and the propositions presented in this subsection.
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8k 2 fL;Fg and 8P 2 fA;Bg: In the pre-election stage, politicians announce policies to group
E such that the marginal benet of targeting one unit of in-kind transfers in terms of probability
of winning elections is equal to the marginal opportunity cost. The benet depends on both the
direct e¤ect in group E and the electoral impact in groups L and F . The cost is measured by the
marginal decrease in probability due to a reduction of targeted net income to group E by ph units.
Given the existence of competitive markets, both political parties are indi¤erent to announce
di¤erent combinations of net taxation policy and in-kind transfers to the non-elderly groups, fL;Fg.
Politicians are indi¤erent between announcing pure private provision, pure public provision or a
combination of public and private provision of health services for each group k such that the
consumption bundle intended for those groups is reached. However, for both political parties
there is a unique equilibrium policy of net taxation and in-kind transfers to group E, (yENP ; h
EN
gP ).
Politicians constrain health consumption choices of the elderly in order to internalize the external
e¤ects in the rest of the groups.
The combination of choosen policies, fyjNP ; hjNgP gEj=L, imply consumption bundles for all groups
that satisfy the economy feasibility constraint. The set of bundles, fcjNP ; hjNP gJj=1, is the one that
maximizes politicianschances of winning elections given expected voting, competitive equilibrium
behavior of citizens and economic feasibility. In Equilibrium:
uh(c
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kN
P ) = phuc(c
kN
P ; h
kN
P ) (44)
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where cENP = y
EN
P ; h
EN
P = h
EN
gP ; c
kN
P = y
kN
P   phhkNmP and hkNP = hkNgP + hkNmP 8k 2 fL;Fg and
P 2 fA;Bg.
Proposition 11 (Externalities and In-kind transfers) Politicians must target in-kind trans-
fers to the group which consumption choices generates positive externalities in the rest of the pop-
ulation.
If politicians target group E uniquely with cash transfers, the elderly expected behavior in
markets imply that they would allocate available resources between health and numeraire without
taking into account the external e¤ects originated into groups L and F . In order to maximize
their chances of winning elections, politicians select a combination of feasible policies such that E
are constrained to consume more health services than they would buy in competitive markets if
targeted resources were given in cash.
In equilibrium, o¢ ce-motivated politicians propose economic policies that, once individuals
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make private choice in competitive markets, implement the same allocation of resources fcjN ; hjNgJj=1.
cjN = cjNA = c
jN
B and h
jN = hjNA = h
jN
B 8j 2 fL;F;Eg (46)
Proposition 12 (Political Allocation with External E¤ects) The political game between o¢ ce-
motivated politicians and self-interested citizens with interdependent preferences yields to a unique
consumption bundle of numeraire commodity and health services for each group, fcjN ; hjNgJj=1:
4.1.2 Distributive Politics
Political parties announce economic policies such that the ideological cut-point is expected to be
equal to zero for all groups. The equilibrium relative treatment between groups in the presence of
external e¤ects is implicitly dened by the following system of equations:
kuc(c
kN ; hkN ) = Euc(c
EN ; hEN ) 8k 2 fL;Fg (47)
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The patterns of numeraire commodity are characterized by the same conditions previously
discussed. Groups with larger concentration of swing voters and lower initial endowments receive
more cash transfers (or pay fewer taxes). However, the consumption of health care is a¤ected
by the presence of externalities. The novel element is that politicians can court simultaneously
swing voters in all groups targeting in-kind transfers to the groups which consumption choices
generate positive externalities in the rest of the population. Those incentives leads politicians to
announce policies that change both the distribution of health services across groups and its overall
consumption in order to court a larger amount of pivotal voters.
In equilibrium, parties equalize across groups the expected electoral returns of targeting one
unit of health care. The expected returns of targeting in-kind transfers in each group depends on
the density of swing voters and the sensitivity of the expected cut-point in each group to changes
in o¤ers of health services. When politicians target in-kind transfers to the elderly they expect
to a¤ect the ideological cut-point of the workers and the entrepreneurs. In order to attract swing
voters in those groups, politicians increase the amount of health services targeted to the elderly.
That increase raises the overall consumption of the good in the economy.
Claim 13 In the presence of external e¤ects, the consumption of health services is larger with
respect to economies where individuals only care about their own economic well-being.
The overall return of targeting in-kind transfers to the elderly depends on the impact within
that group and the external e¤ects generated in the rest of the groups. The return on the elderly
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mimics previous results: the e¤ect of the amount targeted is directly related with the concentration
of pivotal voters and indirectly with the curvature over health services.
The expected electoral returns on groups L and F depends on the salience of external e¤ects
and the convexity of preferences weighted by the density of expected swing voters in each group.
A larger salience, k, means that an extra unit of health care targeted to the elderly is expected
to a¤ect group k ideological cut-point by a larger size. Furthermore, the impact on group ks
ideological cut-o¤ is inversely related with the curvature of utility v() over hE . Therefore, the
quicker marginal utility declines, the lower the expected electoral return in group k.
Resources are scarce and increases of in-kind transfers to the elderly must be balanced with
decreases of targeted resources in other groups. For instance, it could imply a reduction of the
amount of health services targeted to group k. That reduction implies a decrease in the expected
number of votes in k which size depends on its expected density of swing voters and the convexity
of preferences. The expected electoral losses in group k also depend on the relative size of the
groups. The smaller the elderly group is, the lower the expected losses in group k. Politicians can
increase in-kind transfers to the elderly decreasing group ks consumption in a lower proportion.
In equilibrium politicians balance expected gains and losses of votes. The size of in-kind transfers
targeted to the elderly depends on the density of elderly swing voters and the magnitude of other
groups concerns on external e¤ects. The e¤ect of this magnitude on in-kind transfers is directly
related with the success of the workers and the entrepreneurs in distributive politics (i.e. their
expected concentration of swing voters). Furthermore, the size of in-kind transfers is inversely
related with the size of the group E. The larger the size of the group is, the lower the impact of
external e¤ects on the targeted amount. For instance, society ageing will reduce elderly consumption
of health care. In that situation, maintaining previous levels of funding would imply additional
reductions in the consumption levels of the rest of the groups, L and F . Politicians should reduce
in-kind transfers to the elderly in order to court swing voters in the rest of the population.
Furthermore, o¢ ce-motivated politicians target a combination of cash and in-kind transfers
that constraint consumption choices of the elderly regardless of their political clout. Two potential
cases are worthy to discuss. For instance, when the elderly group presents a broader support of
ideological attachments (i.e. low density, E), they could receive low cash transfers but large levels
of health coverage. As an alternative, when the elderly are highly inuential (i.e. high density,
E), politicians target larger in-kind transfers than desired by the old in order to court marginal
voters in non-elderly groups. The elderly would prefer allocations with lower health care quality
and larger available income. However, the expected marginal gains to court swing elderly citizens
with cash would be lower than the expected marginal losses of swing voters within the workers and
the entrepreneurs. Therefore, politicians must constrain elderly consumption decisions in order to
court marginal voters in the rest of the population.
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4.1.3 Allocative E¢ ciency and Markets
In equilibrium, the bundles of numeraire and health services consumed by the workers and the
enterpreneurs, fck; hkgFk=L, satisfy:
MRSkNh;c =MRTh;c = q 8k 2 fL;Fg (49)
Furthermore, the consumption bundle of the elderly, (cE ; hE), which results from the political
process takes into account the existence of external e¤ects:
MRSENhE ;cE +
FX
k=L
k
E
kMRSkNhE ;ck =MRTh;c = q (50)
Proposition 14 (E¢ ciency and External E¤ects) The electoral competition game between o¢ ce-
motivated politicians who court self-interested individuals in the presence of external e¤ects yields
an allocation in the set of Pareto e¢ cient allocations.
The e¢ ciency result is explained by the electoral competition for marginal voters. For instance,
if one party announced only cash transfers to group E, its opponent, with the same amount of
resources, could target in-kind transfers in that group and attract more swing voters from the
rest of the population. The competition for courting the maximum amount of swing voters leads
politicians to announce net taxation and in-kind transfers policies that lead the economy to reach
e¢ cient allocations.
In the case that health care decisions were not subject to the political process, competitive
markets do not internalize external e¤ects. The elderly would not take into account the e¤ect of
their consumption decisions on the rest of the population. Therefore, the political process leads
the economy to achieve Pareto-e¢ cient allocations that markets cannot reach.
It is important to notice that this e¢ ciency result is not obtained by assuming the presence of
benevolent governments. E¢ ciency is the equilibrium outcome of the political process. Looking
for their own-interest, o¢ ce-motivated politicians internalize the external consequences of elderly
health consumption in the rest of the population.
Few contributions have discussed the role of political competition to increase e¢ ciency in the
presence of market imperfections. One exception in the analysis of in-kind transfers is Blomquist
and Christiansen (1999). In the presence of asymmetric information, in-kind transfers could be
used as a screening device that alleviates the self-selection constraint and increases e¢ ciency.21In
polities where citizens have preferences for redistribution toward low income citizens, well-designed
21Blomquist and Christiansen (1999) introduce the main insights of Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) on the screening
role of in-kind transfers into a political economy setting. However, they impose severe constraints into the number of
groups and preferences in order to reduce the political game to one dimension. Those assumptions limit the generality
of their results.
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in-kind transfers lead high and low ability individuals to reveal their type. Politicians compete
for o¢ ce announcing redistributive policies that improve e¢ ciency and equity in the presence of
asymmetric information.
Other relevant contribution that explores the e¢ ciency-enhancing role of electoral competition
is Besley, Persson and Sturm (2010). They analyze the e¤ect of electoral competition on the choice
of pro-growth policies in the US states. They make use of probabilistic voting to model the electoral
competition for voters with partys loyalties (i.e. swing versus core voters). Their results show that
political competition between parties tends to increase e¢ ciency. The larger the competition for
marginal swing voters is, the larger the incentives to choose e¢ cient policies.
5 Commodity Egalitarianism
Recent contributions on positive political economy have suggested that citizenssupport over redis-
tributive policies depends not only on the e¤ect of policies on individualsown economic well-being
but on their beliefs on the fairness of social outcomes.22 Individuals would be averse to inequalities
generated by luck and support policies that reduce those inequalities that they consider unfair. That
literature has focused on views about the proper distribution of income and citizenspreferences
over cash redistribution. However, citizens could also be concerned about the proper consumption
of specic commodities.
In particular, I work the case in which individuals are averse to inequalities in the consumption
of goods such as health and education.23For instance, individuals could believe that health and
education are fundamental rights. These rights not should be related with citizensability to pay
or any other characteristic.
Furthermore, inequalities in the consumption of these goods could be a proxy for unfair in-
equalities. For instance, in a market economy, an unlucky child born in a low income family would
have access to a low quality education. The market provision of education and its e¤ect on the
future childrens income would be due to luck.24The consumption of health services could also be
associated to luck. As an example, the fatal diseases and serious medical conditions caused not by
individual behavior but by random factors such as genetics and virus. In a market economy, the
access to expensive advanced treatments and then the probability of surviving to a fatal disease
depends only on citizensincome.
22Piketty (1995), Alesina and Angeletos (2005), Bénabou and Tirole (2006) are important contributions on the
relation between social beliefs and preferences over redistributive policies. See Alesina and LaFerrara (2004) and
Fong (2001) for empirical work on the US case. Alesina and Giuliano (2010) provide a comprehensive theoretical and
empirical review of the literature.
23This notion of commodity egalitarianism was suggested by James Tobin (1970).
24Gasparini and Pinto (2006) presents a normative analysis based on equality of opportunities to justify aversion
to inequality in the access of education.
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Hence, individuals could be against the inequality in the access to health care and education
because the relation between their consumption and random components associated to luck. The
existence of those unfair inequalities caused by luck could sustain commodity egalitarian prefer-
ences. Other alternatives could be suggested to model social preferences over the consumption of
health and education.25However, the goal of this section is to analyze how incentives for political
redistribution change in the presence of equity concerns limited to specic goods.
5.1 Distributive Politics with Egalitarianism
Consider the same economy with a nite number of groups presented in the preceding sections.
Politicians announce taxation schedules and in-kind transfers, fyjP ; hjgP gJj=1 8P 2 fA;Bg, in order
to win elections. Economic policy platforms must satisfy the economy feasibility constraint (11).
Furthermore, there are competitive markets where citizens are able to acquire health care services.
I assume that citizenspreferences have two components. The rst one measures individuals
own economic well-being. The second component captures the utility derived from social outcomes.
Let 
(h) be citizens common valuation of health care distribution where h = fhjgJj=1 is the
allocation of health services across groups. Furthermore, let j denote the relative weight that
individuals who belong to group j assigns to equity concerns with respect to private utility. The
preferences of a citizen i located in group j can be represented by an additively separable utility
function:
U j(cj ;h) = u(cj ; hj) + j
(h) where h = fhjgJj=1 (51)
The individual private utility is well-represented by the non-satiable preferences (2) discussed
previously. However, it is common to assume that the social preference component is better rep-
resented by satiated preferences. In the commodity egalitarian case, that component could be
represented by the following preferences:

(h) =  1
2
JX
j=1
j(hj   h)2 where h =
JX
j=1
jhj (52)
25For instance, citizens could support that everyone should have access to at least some minimum level of schooling
or medical care. Furthermore, individuals could disagree over the notion of fairness and hold heterogeneous views
about how the consumption of goods should be evaluated.
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5.2 Political Allocation
Solving backwards, I characterize the Political Equilibrium of the game.26 For both political parties,
the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers policies for any group k, (ykNP ; h
kN
gP ), must satisfy:
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(53)
8k; j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg: In the pre-election stage, the expected electoral benet of
targeting one unit of in-kind transfers depends on both the direct e¤ect in group ks economic well-
being and the e¤ect on the distribution of health consumption across groups. Politicians announce
policies to group k such that the marginal benet of targeting in terms of probability of winning
elections is equal to the marginal opportunity cost. The cost is measured by the marginal decrease
in probability due to a reduction of targeted net income to group k by ph units.
In the presence of egalitarian views, for both political parties there exists a unique equilibrium
policy of net taxation and in-kind transfers for each group k, (ykNP ; h
kN
gP ). Furthermore, politicians
choose economic policies such that individuals are expected to no supplement health services in
competitive markets, hjNmP = 0. The combination of choosen policies, fyjNP ; hjNgP gJj=1, imply a set
of consumption bundles fcjNP ; hjNP gJj=1, that maximizes politicians chances of winning elections
given expected voting, competitive equilibrium behavior of citizens and economic feasibility. In
Equilibrium:
uh(c
kN
P ; h
kN
P ) +
JX
j=1
j
k
j
k
j
@
(hN )
@hk
= phuc(c
kN
P ; h
kN
P ) (54)
where cjNP = y
jN
P and h
jN
P = h
jN
gP 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and P 2 fA;Bg.
Proposition 15 (Egalitarianism and In-kind transfers) Politicians constrain consumption choices
of individuals targeting in-kind transfers to all groups in order to reduce inequalities in the con-
sumption of specic commodities.
If politicians target group k uniquely with cash transfers, individuals would allocate available
resources between health and numeraire without taking into account the e¤ect of their decisions
on the health consumption inequality in the overall population. Individuals value an egalitarian
allocation of health, however this valuation has a public good nature which is subject to free-riding
behavior in competitive markets. For this reason, vote-maximizer politicians select a combination of
feasible policies such that fully constrain consumption decisions of individuals. Hence, commodity
egalitarianism prevents that individuals could make their private decisions through competitive
markets. The health care coverage of all individuals is decided by o¢ ce-motivated politicians.
26See Mathematical Appendix C for a detailed discussion and complete characterization of the political equilibrium
and the propositions presented in this subsection.
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In equilibrium, o¢ ce-motivated politicians propose the same economic policies (i.e. policy
convergence) and therefore implement the same allocation of resources fcjN ; hjNgJj=1.
cjN = cjNA = c
jN
B and h
jN = hjNA = h
jN
B 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg (55)
Proposition 16 (Political Allocation with Commodity Egalitarianism) The political game
between o¢ ce-motivated politicians and citizens who are averse to inequalities in the consumption
of specic goods yields to a unique consumption bundle of numeraire commodity and health services
for each group, fcjN ; hjNgJj=1.
5.2.1 Distributive Politics
The equilibrium patterns of cash and in-kind redistribution across groups are implicitly dened by
the following equations:
kuc(c
kN ; hkN ) = k
0
uc(c
k0N ; hk
0N ) (56)
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these equilibrium conditions hold 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P = fA;Bg:
Electoral competition focuses on courting ideological neutral voters in each group. Groups
with higher concentration of swing voters are targeted with both larger cash and in-kind transfers.
However, the existence of egalitarian views limits the use of di¤erential targeting of in-kind transfers
across groups.
In equilibrium, both parties equalize the expected electoral returns of targeting one unit of
health care across groups. The overall return of targeting in-kind transfers to citizens who belong
to any group k has two components. The rst one is the increase of the expected number of votes
in the targeted group by self-interested motives. That e¤ect depends on both the concentration of
swing voters in the group and the marginal impact in citizensown-economic well-being.
The second component captures the e¤ect of targeting in-kind transfers in the distribution of
health. Citizens take into account how in-kind transfers a¤ect the consumption of health in the
overall population. When targeting in-kind transfers to group k increases inequality, it implies a
reduction of the expected number of voters in all groups.
For the particular specication of social preferences previously presented (52), the marginal
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e¤ect of targeting group k on the valuation of inequality for any group j is given by:
@
(hN )
@hk
=  k(hkN   hN ) (58)
The impact on the expected ideological cut-point in any group j is increasing in the utility losses
which rise with health inequality. Therefore, the larger the inequality is, the greater the expected
loss of votes in all groups.
Although all groups are assumed to hold homogeneous valuations of social outcomes, they could
di¤er in their willingness to compromise social preferences in return to economic benets. Thus, the
larger the group-specic salience j is, the larger the impact of health inequalities in the expected
ideological cut-point of group j. The electoral impact of egalitarian views in group j also depends
on its density of swing voters. The larger the density is, the greater the losses of voters.
Furthermore, resources are scarce and increasing in-kind transfers to one group must be balanced
by reducing targeted resources in other groups. For instance, it could imply a reduction of the
amount of health care targeted to group k0. That reduction implies a decrease in the expected
number of votes in k0. The size of that loss depends on group k0s expected density of swing
voters and the convexity of preferences over health. Furthermore, there is an additional increase in
inequality through the reduction of health consumption in k0. Hence, there are additional expected
losses of votes in all groups. In equilibrium, politicians balance the expected gains and losses
of votes and implement a more egalitarian distribution of health. Therefore, groups with more
swing voters receive less health care with respect to a political game in which citizens do not have
egalitarian views.
Hence, in the presence of commodity egalitarianism, politicians announce universal in-kind
transfers. However, the political process does not yield to uniform levels of health consumption.
O¢ ce-motivated politicians exploit individuals concerns for their own economic well-being courting
voters with di¤erential in-kind transfers. Groups with larger concentration of swing voters have
access to higher quality of services. Therefore, even when all citizens agree that a perfect equal
distribution of a good is desirable, this allocation is not politically attainable.
Corollary 17 (Universal Public Provision with Targeting) In the presence of commodity egal-
itarianism, opportunistic politicians implement universal public systems of health care. Neverthe-
less, politicians do not target the same quality of services across groups.
However, commodity egalitarianism reduces the electoral returns of di¤erential in-kind transfers.
Those incentives reduce not only health care inequality but lower politiciansincentives to allocate
resources to in-kind transfers. Devoting resources to cash transfers is electorally more protable.
Claim 18 In an economy with commodity egalitarianism, the inequality levels and the overall con-
sumption of health care would be lower with respect to economies in which individuals only care
about their own economic well-being.
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This crowding out e¤ect is related with the main insights that we learnt from Lizzeri and Persico
(2001, 2004). In a distributive politics game, targetability yields a premium for o¢ ce-motivated
politicians. Politicians have electoral incentives to devote more resources to a targetable policy tool
such as cash transfers and reduce the resources to fund public goods.
Commodity egalitarism introduce a public good nature in the consumption of health services.
The targetability of in-kind transfers is reduced because now the valuation of the distribution of
health consumption is non-rival and non-excludable. Politicians aim to discriminate between voters
and in-kind transfers lose part of their e¤ectiveness. That leads the economy to a reduction in the
aggregate consumption of health services.
In the presence of egalitarian views, the political incentives for targeting in-kind transfers di¤er
from the ones in the consumption externality case. In the latter, politicians use in-kind to court
more swing voters in the rest of the population. Those incentives lead the economy to increase the
consumption of health care. In the former, targeting in-kind transfers aims to reduce the loss of
votes caused by unequal levels of consumption of specic goods. However, di¤erential targeting is
penalized and the overall consumption of health care decreases.
Utilitarian Allocation In the particular case in which all groups had the same extent of ideo-
logical heterogeneity, the marginal returns of targeting both cash and in-kind transfers would be
the same for all groups. Therefore, o¢ ce-motivated politicians announce policies that implement
the utilitarian allocation. Politicians do not have incentives to make di¤erential targeting of cash
transfers. Therefore, the relative electoral advantage of cash over in-kind transfers disappears and
the amount of health care consumption in the economy is maximized.
In that specic case, politicians would not need to resort on in-kind transfers. They could
announce a uniform level of cash transfers such that individuals acquire the intended uniform
amount of health services in competitive markets. Political redistribution would be undertaken from
groups with large initial endowments to low income groups. Furthermore, only in this particular
case, society reaches the socially desired egalitarian allocation of health care.
5.2.2 Allocative E¢ ciency and Markets
The political process leads to a bundle of numeraire and health services consumed by individuals
who belong to group k, 8k 2 f1; :::; Jg, that satises:
MRSkNh;c +
JX
j=1
j
k
jMRSjN

k;cj
=MRTh;c = q (59)
Proposition 19 (E¢ ciency and Egalitarianism) The electoral competition game between o¢ ce-
motivated politicians and self-interested citizens who are averse to commodity inequalities yields an
allocation in the Pareto set.
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Politicians take into account that voters penalize policy proposals that lead to unequal distri-
bution of health consumption. Those incentives drive parties to select menus of net taxation and
in-kind transfers that internalize the presence egalitarian views. Electoral competition for marginal
voters leads to a more egalitarian consumption of specic goods and to achieve allocative e¢ ciency
that a market economy cannot reach.
In competitive markets, even when all individuals share the same egalitarian preferences, each in-
dividual has an incentive to free-ride on the egalitarian allocation by others. Therefore, in economies
with di¤erent income levels, normality of goods leads markets to provide unequal distributions of
consumption depending on the dispersion of available income.
In order to overcome the free-rider problem, politicians announce combinations of economic
policies that fully constrain individualshealth consumption decisions. In spite of the existence of
competitive markets, o¢ ce-motivated politicians must crowd out individual market decisions and
choose health consumption of all individuals.
That result is not obtained because of a benevolent government that takes into account egali-
tarian tastes in order to maximize a given denition of social welfare. However, it is the result of
the electoral competition between o¢ ce-motivated politicians. In order to win elections, politicians
internalize the fact that citizens are willing to sacrice part of their own economic well-being in
order to get a more egalitarian distribution of goods.
It is commonly presumed that politics leads to ine¢ cient provision of public goods. However, as
previously discussed, in static models of electoral competition, those claims are due to the modeling
restrictions in the available policy set. Besley (2007) proposes a probabilistic voting electoral
competition model to overcome those limitations. As an example, Besley introduces the proposed
model into the political provision of pure public goods in the presence of distributive politics.
Results show that political competition leads politicians to implement a Lindhal Samuelson rule
depending on the politicial clout of core and swing voters. My analysis focuses on swing voters and
it is consistent with the e¢ ciency result when I introduce a public good nature in the valuation of
private goods.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides new insights on the political incentives to redistribution through in-kind trans-
fers. I have shown that even when markets work properly and societies do not have preferences
for redistribution, the market allocation is not politically sustainable. O¢ ce-motivated politicians
have incentives to undertake political redistribution. However, it does not necessarily imply that
redistribution must occur through in-kind transfers.
Indeed, in economies with competitive markets, in-kind transfers are an additional policy tool
that politicians might use to reach their desired allocation of resources. Nevertheless, political
31
parties could win elections by promising di¤erential cash transfers across groups of voters. That
result contrasts with former positive political economy contributions in which in-kind transfers
emerge as a political instrument to redistribute resources across groups. This paper shows that
without imposing severe constraints in the available taxation technology, the pure redistributive
motive alone could not explain the use of in-kind transfers by politicians.
However, I found that in-kind redistribution is politically necessary in the presence of inter-
dependent preferences such as consumption externalities and equity concerns. My research shows
that when citizens care about other individualsconsumption of specic commodities, politicians
have incentives to make use of in-kind transfers. Targeting specic groups of voters with in-kind
rather than cash transfers allows politicians to simultaneously attract voters in other groups with
the same amount of resources.
Furthermore, I found that electoral competition for marginal voters exhausts potential Pareto
improvements in the economy. The political process reaches Pareto e¢ cient allocations that markets
cannot reach in the presence of equity concerns and externalities. This e¢ ciency result is not
obtained by assuming the existence of a benevolent government that implements in-kind transfers
either to correct market imperfections or to satisfy equity concerns. Instead, the e¢ cient allocation
is the equilibrium outcome of political game between politicians and voters. Politicians choose
in-kind rather than cash transfers when the amount of voters that they can attract is larger.
In order to handle political equilibria with multidimensional policy space, I have adopted a
well-known probabilistic voting model. That model is based on the literature of distributional
politics and swing voters established by Lindbeck and Weibull (19987) and Dixit and Londregan
(1996). Those contributions have focused on the allocation of cash transfers across social groups.
My research examines political incentives for redistribution when politicians are able to use both
in-kind and cash transfers when market alternatives are also feasible. Furthermore, I extend the
literature on redistributive politics exploring how political redistribution is a¤ected by the presence
of interdependent preferences between groups of voters.
Some direct extensions of this distributive politics framework with competitive markets are wor-
thy to be considered for further research. I rst aim to explore the relation between heterogeneous
preferences and political redistribution. For instance, I could assume that individualsself-interested
preferences over commodities are related with some idiosyncratic characteristics such as age. As
an example, the young households could prefer higher quality educational services than the old
citizens. This extension would allow us to discuss the political incentives for tagging individuals
with immutable characteristic either through in-kind or cash transfers.
Furthermore, I intend to endogenize individualsincome by introducing labor supply decisions.
That would enable us to analyze the potential trade-o¤ between allocative e¢ ciency and politi-
cal redistribution. For instance, the existence of information asymmetries would constraint the
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available government instruments to tax individualsabilities. In that case, when governments can
uniquely use distortionary taxation, redistribution of resources generates deadweight losses. I aim
to explore the political incentives to use in-kind instead of cash transfers in order to increase the
e¢ ciency of the taxation system. That could enlarge the available amount of resources for polit-
ical redistribution. Further research is necessary to analyze these extensions which might provide
interesting new results.
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
A. DISTRIBUTIONAL GAME
A.1. Political Equilibrium
Taking the opponents economic policies as given, each political party P 2 fA;Bg chooses a
combination of net taxation policy and public provision of health care for each group, fyjP ; hjgP gJj=1;
that maximizes its chances of winning elections subject to economic feasibility and non-negativity
constraints. Parties take into account citizensexpected voting decisions (stage 2 ) and individuals
choices in competitive markets (stage 3 ). The policy choice problem of party A is given by:
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The policy choice problem of political party B is symmetric. The First Order Conditions for
both political parties P 2 fA;Bg are dened as:
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Solving backwards, I characterize the Political Equilibrium of the game. The system of equations
formed by the best responses for each political party and their feasibility constraints, simultaneously
determine the Nash Equilibrium in the rst stage of the game.Therefore, for both political parties,
the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers policies announced to group j, (yjNP ; h
jN
gP ), must
satisfy:
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8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg. Those equilibrium conditions hold if and only if taxation policies
announced by parties imply a positive level of net income for all groups, fyjNP gJj=1 > 0. .
Proof. Suppose that group j is targeted no numeraire commodity, yjP = 0: By Envelope Theorem:
dV jP (y
j
P ; h
j
gP )
dyj
= uc(0; h) =1 (67)
Thus equation (66) would not hold. Therefore, equilibrium net taxation policy must imply a positive
available income for each group, yjNP > 0; and then, in equilibrium, the multipliers associated to the
non-negative constraints of net income are equal to zero, jNyP = 0 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and P 2 fA;Bg.
Furthermore, for each group j, politicians must decide whether targeting in-kind transfers.
In the case that party P 2 fA;Bg chooses not targeting in-kind transfers to group j, hjNgP = 0,
politicians take into account that voters are expected to purchase health care in competitive markets
with their available income yjNP > 0. For any positive net income targeted by party P , the optimal
behavior in competitive markets of an individual who belongs to group j is characterized by:
uh(y
j
P   phhjmP ; hjmP ) = phuc(yjP   phhjmP ; hjmP ) (68)
When individuals purchase health care through competitive markets and there is no public
provision, by Envelope Theorem:
dV jSP (y
j
P ; h
j
gP )
dyj
= uc(y
j
P   phhjmP ; hjmP ) (69)
dV jSP (y
j
P ; h
j
gP )
dhjg
= uh(y
j
P   phhjmP ; hjmP ) (70)
Given the expected behavior of voters in competitive markets, equilibrium condition (66) for a
group j not targeted with in-kind transfers holds if and only if the targeted net taxation policy,
yjNP , implies that the multiplier associated to the non-negative constraint of in-kind transfers must
be zero, jNhP = 0. Hence, the equilibrium condition for a group j not targeted with in-kind tranfers
that acquires health services in competitive markets, hjNmP , is given by:
uh(y
jN
P   phhjNmP ; hjNmP ) = phuc(yjNP   phhjNmP ; hjNmP ) (71)
As an alternative, political party P 2 fA;Bg could choose targeting in-kind transfers to group
j, hjNgP > 0 and then 
jN
hP = 0. In that case, politicians take into account that voters in group j
are expected not to make private purchases of health care in markets, hjNmP = 0, if and only if this
condition holds:
uh(y
j
P ; h
j
gP )  phuc(yjP ; hjgP ) (72)
37
Otherwise, when the sigh of this condition is reversed, politicians expect that individuals make
private purchases, hjNmP > 0. The expected optimal behavior of individuals that suplement health
services in competitive markets is given by:
uh(y
j
P   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) = phuc(yjP   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) (73)
In the rst alternative, when individuals do not purchase health care through competitive
markets and there is public provision, by Envelope Theorem:
dV jNSP (y
j
P ; h
j
gP )
dyj
= uc(y
j
P ; h
j
gP ) (74)
dV jNSP (y
j
P ; h
j
gP )
dhjg
= uh(y
j
P ; h
j
gP ) (75)
Thus, party Ps equilibrium condition (66) when group j is targeted with in-kind transfers,
hjNgP > 0, and net income, y
jN
P > 0, such that individuals do not supplement health services,
hjNmP = 0, is given by:
uh(y
jN
P ; h
jN
gP ) = phuc(y
jN
P ; h
jN
gP ) (76)
Therefore, in equilibrium, condition (72) for group j holds with equality.
Otherwise, when individuals purchase health care through competitive markets and there is
public provision, by Envelope Theorem:
dV jSP (y
j
P ; h
j
gP )
dyj
= uc(y
j
P   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) (77)
dV jSP (y
j
P ; h
j
gP )
dhjg
= uh(y
j
P   phhjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) (78)
Hence, party Ps equilibrium condition (66) when group j is targeted with in-kind transfers,
hjNgP > 0, and net income, y
jN
P > 0, such that individuals do supplement health services with
purchases in markets, hjNmP > 0, is given by:
uh(y
jN
P   phhjNmP ; hjNgP + hjNmP ) = phuc(yjNP   phhjNmP ; hjNgP + hjNmP ) (79)
Thus, the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers policies for any group j, (yjNP ; h
jN
gP ) ,
must satisfy:
 

jj
dV jP (y
jN
P ; h
jN
gP )
dhjg
= ph
 

jj
dV jP (y
jN
P ; h
jN
gP )
dyj
(80)
8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg: In the pre-election stage, politicians announce policies such that
the marginal benet of targeting one unit of in-kind transfers in terms of probability of winning
elections is equal to the marginal opportunity cost. That cost is measured by the marginal decrease
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in probability due to a reduction of targeted net income by ph units. The presence of competitive
markets allows the existence of multiple equilibrium policies for each group j. In equilibrium, both
political parties are indi¤erent to announce di¤erent combinations of net taxation policy and in-
kind transfers for each social group j such that (80) holds. Therefore, the targeted consumption
bundle of numeraire and health care to group j implicitly dened by (71), (76) and (79) is the same
regardless of the choosen equilibrium policy. In Equilibrium:
uh(c
jN
P ; h
jN
P ) = phuc(c
jN
P ; h
jN
P ) (81)
where cjNP = y
jN
P   phhjNmP and hjNP = hjNgP + hjNmP 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and P 2 fA;Bg; with yjNP >
0; hjNgP  0 and hjNmP  0.
A.2. Distributive Politics
From the the First Order Conditions for both political parties P 2 fA;Bg; taking (61) for a
pair of groups k and k0 and arranging I get:
 

k
dV kP (y
k
P ; h
k
gP )
dyk
+ kyP =
 

k
0 dV
k0
P (y
k0
P ; h
k0
gP )
dyk0
+ k
0
yP (82)
Given the equilibrium policies for each group j discussed above, the relative treatment between
groups in terms of numeraire are implicitly dened by:
kuc(c
kN ; hkN ) = k
0
uc(c
k0N ; hk
0N ) 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (83)
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P   phhkNmP and hkNP = hkNgP + hkNmP 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg and P 2 fA;Bg; with
ykNP > 0; h
kN
gP  0 and hkNmP  0:
Similarly taking the FOCs (62) for a pair of groups k and k0, the equilibrium patterns of health
services across groups of voters are given by:
kuh(c
kN ; hkN ) = k
0
uh(c
k0N ; hk
0N ) 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (84)
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P   phhkNmP and hkNP = hkNgP + hkNmP 8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg and P 2 fA;Bg; with
ykNP > 0; h
kN
gP  0 and hkNmP  0:
A.3. First Best Allocations: Allocative E¢ ciency
The rst-best problem consists of the maximization of the weighted average of individual util-
itites with group-specic Pareto weights, j , subject to the economy feasibility constraint. The
solution to this optimization problem yields the set of Pareto e¢ cient allocations:
max
fcj ;hjgJj=1
JX
j=1
jju(cj ; hj) s.t
JX
j=1
jcj +
JX
j=1
jqhj 
JX
j=1
jwj (85)
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The FOCs for an interior optimum are given by:
[cj ] jjuc = 
j 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg (86)
[hj ] jjuh = 
jq 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg (87)
The set of Pareto e¢ cient allocation of resources, fcjPO; hjPOgJj=1, satises (86), (87) and the
economy feasibility constraint such that:
uh(c
j
PO; h
j
PO)
uc(c
j
PO; h
j
PO)
= q !MRSjh;c =MRTh;c 8j (88)
In a Pareto e¢ cient allocation the rate at which individuals are willing to trade health services
for numeraire commodity is equal across groups and equal to the rate at which the economy is able
to transform numeraire into health care.
In the political equilibrium, the combination of choosen policies, fyjNP ; hjNgP gJj=1 is such that (81)
holds for all P 2 fA;Bg. Those equilibrium policies imply consumption bundles for all groups,
fcjNP ; hjNP gJj=1, that satisfy the economy feasibility constraint given expected voting and competitive
equilibrium behavior of citizens. In equilibrium:
uh(c
jN
P ; h
jN
P ) = phuc(c
jN
P ; h
jN
P )!MRSjNh;c =MRTh;c 8j (89)
where cjNP = y
jN
P   phhjNmP and hjNP = hjNgP + hjNmP 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and P 2 fA;Bg; with yjNP >
0; hjNgP  0 and hjNmP  0.
Therefore, the political process leads the economy to reach a Pareto E¢ cient allocation.
B. EXTERNAL EFFECTS
B.1. Political Equilibrium
The stages of the political game with externalities follow symmetric to the pure distributional
game. However, in the presence of external e¤ects, the indirect utility functions of individuals who
belong to groups fL;F;Eg are given by:
V kP (y
k
P ; h
k
gP ; h
E
gP ) = u(y
k
P   phkmP ; hkgP + hkmP ) + kv(hEgP + hEmP ) 8k 2 fL;Fg (90)
V EP (y
E
P ; h
E
gP ) = u(y
E
P   phEmP ; hEgP + hEmP ) (91)
where yjP  0; hjmP  0; and hjgP  0 8j 2 fL;F;Eg and 8P 2 fA;Bg:
Therefore, the swing voter type in group k 2 fL;Fg is dened as:
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k = V kA(y
k
A; h
k
gA; h
E
gA)  V kB(ykB; hkgB; hEgB)  " (92)
The swing voter type in the elderly group, E, follows:
E = V EA (y
E
A ; h
E
gA)  V EB (yEB ; hEgB)  " (93)
Taking into account the presence of external e¤ects, the policy choice problem of party A is
given by:
$A =
1
2
+
 

"
FX
k=L
kk
h
V kA(y
k
A; h
k
gA; h
E
gA)  V kB(xB)
i
+ EE

V EA (y
E
A ; h
E
gA)  V EB (xB)
#
+A
24w   JX
j=1
jyjA  
JX
j=1
jphh
j
gA
35+ JX
j=1
jjyAy
j
A +
JX
j=1
jjhAh
j
gA (94)
The policy choice problem is symmetric to political party B. The First Order Conditions for
both political parties P 2 fA;Bg are dened as:
[yk]
 

kk
dV kP (y
k
P ; h
k
gP ; h
E
gP )
dyk
+ kkyP = 
kP 8k 2 fL;Fg (95)
[yE ]
 

EE
dV EP (y
E
P ; h
E
gP )
dyE
+ EEyP = 
EP (96)
[hkg ]
 

kk
dV kP (y
k
P ; h
k
gP ; h
E
gP )
dhkg
+ kkhP = 
kphP 8k 2 fL;Fg (97)
[hEg ]
 

"
EE
dV EP (y
E
P ; h
E
gP )
dhEg
+
FX
k=L
kk
dV kP (y
k
P ; h
k
gP ; h
E
gP )
dhEg
#
+ EEhP = 
EphP (98)
P
24w   EX
j=L
jyjP  
EX
j=L
jphh
j
gP
35 = 0 (99)
jyP y
j
P = 0 ; 
j
hPh
j
gP = 0 8j 2 fL;F;Eg (100)
P  0 jyP  0 ; jhP  0 8j 2 fL;F;Eg (101)
The system of equations formed by the best responses for each political party and their fea-
sibility constraints, simultaneously determine de Nash Equilibrium in the rst stage of the game.
For both political parties, the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers policies for any group
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k 2 fL;Fg, (ykNP ; hkNgP ), satisfy the same equilibrium conditions discussed for an economy with-
out external e¤ects. Furthermore, the equilibrium net taxation policy must also imply a positive
available income for group E, yENP > 0: Therefore, in equilibrium the multiplier associated to the
non-negative constraint of net income of the elderly is equal to zero, ENyP = 0 8 P 2 fA;Bg.
Hence, equilibrium policies targeted to group E must satisfy:
 

"
EE
dV EP (y
EN
P ; h
EN
gP )
dhEg
+
FX
k=L
kk
dV kP (y
kN
P ; h
kN
gP ; h
EN
gP )
dhEg
#
+EEhP = ph
 

EE
dV EP (y
EN
P ; h
EN
gP )
dyE
(102)
Politicians must decide whether targeting in-kind transfers to the elderly. In the case that
party P 2 fA;Bg chooses not targeting in-kind transfers to group E, hENgP = 0, politicians take
into account that voters are expected to purchase health care in competitive markets with their
available income yENP > 0. For any positive net income targeted by party P , the optimal behavior
in competitive markets of an individual who belongs to group E is characterized by:
uh(y
E
P   phhEmP ; hEmP ) = phuc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEmP ) (103)
When the elderly purchase health care through competitive markets and there is no public
provision, by Envelope Theorem:
dV EP (y
E
P ; h
E
gP )
dyE
= uc(y
E
P   phhEmP ; hEmP ) (104)
dV EP (y
E
P ; h
E
gP )
dhEg
= uh(y
E
P   phhEmP ; hEmP ) (105)
Furthermore, elderlys health care consumption a¤ects the utility of individuals who belong to
group k 2 fL;Fg, by Envelope Theorem:
dV kP (y
k
P ; h
k
gP ; h
E
gP )
dhEg
= kvhE (h
E
mP ) (106)
Given (104), (105) and (106) and introducing into the equilibrium condition (102), it yields:
 

"
EEuh(y
E
P   phhEmP ; hEmP ) +
FX
k=L
kkkvhE (h
E
mP )
#
+EEhP = ph
 

EEuc(y
E
P phhEmP ; hEmP )
(107)
"
uh(y
E
P   phhEmP ; hEmP )
uc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEmP )
+
FX
k=L
kk
EE
k
vhE (h
E
mP )
uc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEmP )
+
EEhP
EEuc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEmP )

 
#
= ph
(108)
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Given elderlys expected behavior in competitive markets (103), equilibrium condition would
be:
"
ph +
FX
k=L
kk
EE
k
vhE (h
E
mP )
uc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEmP )
#
+
EEhP
EEuc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEmP )

 
= ph (109)
By concavity, vh > 0 and uc > 0. Therefore, equilibrium condition holds if and only if EhP < 0
which is not possible. Thus, in equilibrium parties must target in-kind transfers to the elderly,
hENgP > 0 8 P 2 fA;Bg, and then EhP = 0 8 P 2 fA;Bg. Hence, for both political parties, the
equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers policies announced to group E, (yENP ; h
EN
gP ), must
satisfy:
 

"
EE
dV EP (y
EN
P ; h
EN
gP )
dhEg
+
FX
k=L
kk
dV kP (y
kN
P ; h
kN
gP ; h
EN
gP )
dhEg
#
= ph
 

EE
dV EP (y
EN
P ; h
EN
gP )
dyE
(110)
8k 2 fL;Fg and 8P 2 fA;Bg:
Politicians choose in-kind transfers to the elderly taking into account that voters in group E
are expected not to make private purchases of health care in markets, hENmP = 0, if and only if this
condition holds:
uh(y
E ; hEgP )  phuc(yEP ; hEgP ) (111)
otherwise, when the sigh of this condition is reversed, politicians expect that individuals make
private purchases, hENmP > 0. The expected optimal behavior of individuals that suplement health
services in competitive markets is given by:
uh(y
E
P   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP ) = phuc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP ) (112)
In the rst place, when the elderly purchase health care through competitive markets and there
is public provision, by Envelope Theorem:
dV EP (y
E
P ; h
E
gP )
dyE
= uc(y
E
P   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP ) (113)
dV EP (y
E
P ; h
E
gP )
dhEg
= uh(y
E
P   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP ) (114)
Furthermore, elderlys health care consumption a¤ects the utility of individuals who belong to
group k 2 fL;Fg, by Envelope Theorem:
dV kP (y
k
P ; h
k
gP ; h
E
gP )
dhEg
= kvhE (h
E
gP + h
E
mP ) (115)
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Given (113), (114) and (115) and introducing into the equilibrium condition (110), it yields:
 

"
EEuh(y
E
P   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP ) +
FX
k=L
kkkvhE (h
E
gP + h
E
mP )
#
= ph
 

EEuc(y
E
P phhEmP ; hEgP+hEmP )
(116)
"
uh(y
E
P   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP )
uc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP )
+
FX
k=L
kk
EE
k
vhE (h
E
gP + h
E
mP )
uc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP )
#
= ph (117)
Given elderlys expected behavior in competitive markets (112), equilibrium condition would
be: "
ph +
FX
k=L
kk
EE
k
vhE (h
E
gP + h
E
mP )
uc(yEP   phhEmP ; hEgP + hEmP )
#
= ph (118)
By concavity, vh > 0 and uc > 0. Therefore, equilibrium condition does not hold. Thus,
in equilibrium both parties fA;Bg must target a combination of net taxation policy and in-kind
transfers to the elderly (yENP ; h
EN
gP ) such that the elderly do not supplement health services in
competitive markets, hEmP = 0. When the elderly do not purchase health care through competitive
markets and there is public provision, by Envelope Theorem:
dV EP (y
E
P ; h
E
gP )
dyE
= uc(y
E
P ; h
E
gP ) (119)
dV EP (y
E
P ; h
E
gP )
dhEg
= uh(y
E
P ; h
E
gP ) (120)
Furthermore, elderlys health care consumption a¤ects the utility of individuals who belong to
group k 2 fL;Fg, by Envelope Theorem:
dV kP (y
k
P ; h
k
gP ; h
E
gP )
dhEg
= kvhE (h
E
gP ) (121)
Given (119), (120) and (121) and introducing into the equilibrium condition (110), it yields:
 

"
EEuh(y
EN
P ; h
EN
gP ) +
FX
k=L
kkkvhE (h
EN
gP )
#
= ph
 

EEuc(y
EN
P ; h
EN
gP ) (122)
Arranging terms, party Ps equilibrium condition when group E is targeted with in-kind trans-
fers, hENgP > 0, and net income, y
EN
P > 0, such that individuals do not supplement health services,
hENmP = 0, is given by:
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uh(c
EN
P ; h
EN
P ) +
FX
k=L
k
E
k
E
kvhE (h
EN
P ) = phuc(c
EN
P ; h
EN
P ) (123)
8 k 2 fL;Fg and 8 P 2 fA;Bg; where cENP = yENP and hENP = hENgP .
B.2. Distributive Politics
The relative treatment of health services across groups is a¤ected by the presence of external
e¤ects. From the the First Order Conditions for both political parties P 2 fA;Bg; taking (97) for
group k and (98) for the elderly, in equilibrium:
 

k
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kN
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kN
gP ; h
EN
gP )
dhkg
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264 E
dV ENP (y
EN
P ;h
EN
gP )
dhEg
+
+
FP
k=L
k
E
k
dV kNP (y
kN
P ;h
kN
gP ;h
EN
gP )
dhEg
375 8k 2 fL;Fg (124)
Hence, the political relative treatment in terms of health services between elderly and non-
elderly citizens is given by:
kuh(c
kN ; hkN ) = Euh(c
EN ; hEN ) +
FX
k=L
k
E
kkvhE (h
EN ) 8k 2 fL;Fg (125)
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P   phhkNmP and hkN = hkNP = hkNgP + hkNmP 8k 2 fL;Fg; cEN = cENP = yENP
and hEN = hENP = h
EN
gP ; with y
kN
P > 0; h
kN
gP  0, hkNmP  0; yENP > 0 and hENgP > 0 for all
P 2 fA;Bg.
Similarly, I can characterize the relative treatment of numeraire commodity across groups. From
the the First Order Conditions for both political parties P 2 fA;Bg; taking (95) for group k and
(96) for the elderly, in equilibrium:
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dyE
8k 2 fL;Fg (126)
Thus, the political relative treatment in terms of numeraire between elderly and non-elderly
citizens is given by:
kuc(c
kN ; hkN ) = Euc(c
EN ; hEN ) 8k 2 fL;Fg (127)
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P   phhkNmP and hkN = hkNP = hkNgP + hkNmP 8k 2 fL;Fg; cEN = cENP = yENP
and hEN = hENP = h
EN
gP ; with y
kN
P > 0; h
kN
gP  0, hkNmP  0; yENP > 0 and hENgP > 0 for all
P 2 fA;Bg.
B.3. Allocative E¢ ciency
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The rst-best problem consists of the maximization of the weighted average of individual util-
itites with group-specic Pareto weights, j , subject to the economy feasibility constraint. The
solution to this optimization problem yields the set of Pareto e¢ cient allocations:
max
fcj ;hjgFj=L
FX
k=L
kk
h
u(ck; hk) + kkv(hE)
i
+ EEu(cE ; hE) (128)
s.t.
JX
j=1
jcj +
JX
j=1
jqhj 
JX
j=1
jwj (129)
The FOCs for an interior optimum are given by:
[cj ] jjuc = 
j 8j 2 fL;F;Eg (130)
[hk] kkuh = 
kq 8k 2 fL;Fg (131)
[hE ] EEuh +
FX
k=L
kkkvhE = 
Eq (132)
The set of Pareto e¢ cient allocation of resources, fcjPO; hjPOgEj=L, satises (130,131,132) and
the economy feasibility constraint. Therefore, Pareto e¢ cient allocations for the non-elderly groups
satisfy:
uh(c
k
PO; h
k
PO)
uc(ckPO; h
k
PO)
= q !MRSkh;c =MRTh;c 8k 2 fL;Fg (133)
Furthermore, from the FOCs for consumption of the numeraire (130) I obtain:
k
E
=
uc(c
E
PO; h
E
PO)
uc(ckPO; h
k
PO)
(134)
Therefore, a Pareto e¢ cient allocation of numeraire and health for group E must satisfy:
uh(c
E
PO; h
E
PO)
uc(cEPO; h
E
PO)
+
FX
k=L
k
E
k
vhE (h
E
PO)
uc(ckPO; h
k
PO)
= q (135)
MRSEh;c +
FX
k=L
k
E
kMRSkhE ;ck = MRTh;c
In the political equilibrium, both parties, P 2 fA;Bg, announce a menu of net taxation and
in-kind transfers policies targeted to the elderly, (yENP ; h
EN
gP ); such that:
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uh(c
EN
P ; h
EN
P ) +
FX
k=L
k
E
k
E
kvhE (h
EN
P ) = phuc(c
EN
P ; h
EN
P ) (136)
8 k 2 fL;Fg and 8 P 2 fA;Bg; where cENP = yENP and hENP = hENgP .
From the equilibrium relative treatment between groups in terms of numeraire (127) I obtain:
k
E
=
uc(c
EN ; hEN )
uc(ckN ; hkN )
8k 2 fL;Fg (137)
Introducing (137) into the equilibrium political allocation of the elderly (136):
uh(c
EN
P ; h
EN
P ) +
FX
k=L
uc(c
EN ; hEN )
uc(ckN ; hkN )
k
E
kvhE (h
EN
P ) = phuc(c
EN
P ; h
EN
P )
uh(c
EN
P ; h
EN
P )
uc(cENP ; h
EN
P )
+
FX
k=L
k
E
k
vhE (h
EN
P )
uc(ckN ; hkN )
= ph
MRSENh;c +
FX
k=L
k
E
kMRSkNhE ;ck = MRTh;c (138)
Hence, the consumption bundle of the elderly, (cEN ; hEN ), that results from the political process
is Pareto e¢ cient.
Furthermore, from the the First Order Conditions for both political parties P 2 fA;Bg; taking
(95) and (97) for group k in equilibrium:
 

dV kNP (y
kN
P ; h
kN
gP ; h
EN
gP )
dhkg
= ph
 

dV kNP (y
kN
P ; h
kN
gP ; h
EN
gP )
dyk
8k 2 fL;Fg (139)
In the political equilibrium, both parties, P 2 fA;Bg, announce a menu of net taxation and in-
kind transfers policies targeted to each group k, (ykNP ; h
kN
gP ), such that (81) holds. Those equilibrium
policies imply consumption bundles for each group k, (ckNP ; h
kN
P ), that satisfy the economy feasibility
constraint given expected voting and competitive equilibrium behavior of citizens. In equilibrium:
uh(c
kN
P ; h
kN
P ) = phuc(c
kN
P ; h
kN
P ) (140)
MRSkNh;c = MRTh;c 8k 2 fL;Fg
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P   phhkNmP and hkN = hkNP = hkNgP + hkNmP 8k 2 fL;Fg; with ykNP > 0;
hkNgP  0, hkNmP  0 for all P 2 fA;Bg:
Therefore, the political process leads the economy to reach a Pareto E¢ cient allocation.
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C. COMMODITY EGALITARIANISM
C.1. Political Equilibrium
The stages of the political game with commodity egalitarianism follows symmetric to the pure
distributional game. Nevertheless, in the presence of egalitarianism, the indirect utility functions
of individuals who belong to groups group j 2 f1; :::; Jg are given by:
V jP (y
j
P ;hgP ) = u(y
j
P   phjmP ; hjgP + hjmP ) + j
(hP ) (141)
where yjP  0; hjmP  0; hjgP  0; and hP = fhjgP + hjmP gJj=1 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg.
Furthermore, I work with the case:

(hP ) =  1
2
JX
j=1
j(hjgP + h
j
mP   hP )2 where h =
JX
j=1
j(hjgP + h
j
mP ) (142)
Therefore, the swing voter type in group j 2 f1; :::; Jg is dened as:
j = V jA(y
j
A;hgA)  V jB(yjB;hgB)  " (143)
Taking into account the presence of egalitarianism, the policy choice problem of party A is given
by:
$A =
1
2
+
 

24 JX
j=1
jj
h
V jA(y
j
A;hgA)  V jB(xB)
i35+ (144)
+A
24w   JX
j=1
jyjA  
JX
j=1
jphh
j
gA
35+ JX
j=1
jjyAy
j
A +
JX
j=1
jjhAh
j
gA
The policy choice problem is symmetric to political party B. The First Order Conditions for
both political parties P 2 fA;Bg are dened as:
[yk]
 

kk
dV kP (y
k
P ;hgP )
dyk
+ kkyP = 
kP 8k 2 f1; :::; Jg (145)
[hkg ]
 

264 kk
dV kP (y
k
P ;hgP )
dhkg
+
+
JP
j=1
jj
dV jP (y
j
P ;hgP )
dhkg
375+ kkhP = kphP 8 k and j 6= k 2 f1; :::; Jg (146)
P
24w   EX
j=L
jyjP  
EX
j=L
jphh
j
gP
35 = 0 (147)
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jyP y
j
P = 0 ; 
j
hPh
j
gP = 0 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg (148)
P  0 jyP  0 ; jhP  0 8j 2 f1; :::; Jg (149)
The system of equations formed by the best responses for each political party and their feasibility
constraints, simultaneously determine the Nash Equilibrium in the rst stage of the game. For both
political parties, the equilibrium net taxation policy must imply a positive net income for all groups,
yjNP > 0 8j and 8P 2 fA;Bg. Thus, in equilibrium the multiplier associated to the non-negativity
constraint of net income is equal to zero for all groups, jNyP = 0 8j and 8P 2 fA;Bg. Hence,
equilibrium policies targeted to group k must satisfy:
 

264 kk
dV kP (y
k
P ;hgP )
dhkg
+
+
JP
j=1
jj
dV jP (y
j
P ;hgP )
dhkg
375+ kkhP = ph kk dV kP (ykP ;hgP )dyk 8k 2 f1; :::; Jg (150)
Politicians must decide whether targeting in-kind transfers to group k. In the case that party
P 2 fA;Bg chooses not targeting in-kind transfers to group k, hkNgP = 0, politicians take into account
that voters are expected to purchase health care in competitive markets with their available income
ykNP > 0. For any positive net income targeted by party P , the optimal behavior in competitive
markets of an individual who belongs to group k is characterized by:
uh(y
k
P   phhkmP ; hkmP ) = phuc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkmP ) (151)
When individuals who belong to group k purchase health care through competitive markets and
there is no public provision, by Envelope Theorem:
dV kP (y
k
P ;hgP )
dyk
= uc(y
k
P   phhkmP ; hkmP ) (152)
dV kP (y
k
P ;hgP )
dhkg
= uh(y
k
P   phhkmP ; hkmP ) + k
@
(hP )
@hkg
(153)
Furthermore, group ks health care consumption a¤ects the utility of individuals in the rest of
the population, by Envelope Theorem:
dV jP (y
j
P ;hgP )
dhkg
= j
@
(hP )
@hkg
8j 6= k (154)
Given (152), (153) and (154) and introducing into the equilibrium condition (150), it yields:
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+k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j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khP = ph k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2664
uh(y
k
P phhkmP ;hkmP )
uc(ykP phhkmP ;hkmP )
+
+
k
@
(hP )
@hkg
+
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jjj
@
(hP )
@hkg
uc(ykP phhkmP ;hkmP )
3775+ kkhPkkuc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkmP )  = ph (156)
Given the expected behavior in competitive markets of individuals who belong to group k (151),
equilibrium condition would be:
26664ph +
k @
(hP )
@hkg
+
JP
j=1
jjj @
(hP )
@hkg
uc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkmP )
37775+ kkhPkkuc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkmP )  = ph 8k 2 f1; :::; Jg
(157)
This equilibrium condition holds if and only if all groups have the same ideological heterogeneity
and therefore are targeted with the same amount of cash transfers. Otherwise, in equilibrium
parties must target in-kind transfers to all groups, hkNg > 0 8P 2 fA;Bg, and then khP = 0
8P 2 fA;Bg. Hence, for both political parties, the equilibrium net taxation and in-kind transfers
policies announced to group k, (ykNP ; h
kN
gP ), must satisfy:
 

24kk dV kP (ykP ;hgP )
dhkg
+
JX
j=1
jj
dV jP (y
j
P ;hgP )
dhkg
35 = ph 

kk
dV kP (y
k
P ;hgP )
dyk
(158)
8k 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg:
Politicians choose in-kind transfers to individuals who belong to group k taking into account
that voters in group k are expected not to make private purchases of health care in markets,
hkNmP = 0, if and only if this condition holds:
uh(y
k; hkgP )  phuc(ykP ; hkgP ) (159)
Otherwise, when the sigh of this condition is reversed, politicians expect that individuals make
private purchases, hkNmP > 0. The expected optimal behavior of individuals that suplement health
services in competitive markets is given by:
uh(y
k
P   phhkmP ; hkgP + hkmP ) = phuc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkgP + hkmP ) (160)
In the rst alternative, when individuals who belong to group k purchase health care through
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competitive markets and there is public provision, by Envelope Theorem:
dV kP (y
k
P ;hgP )
dyk
= uc(y
k
P   phhkmP ; hkgP + hkmP ) (161)
dV kP (y
k
P ;hgP )
dhkg
= uh(y
k
P   phhkmP ; hkgP + hkmP ) + k
@
(hP )
@hkg
(162)
Furthermore, group ks health care consumption a¤ects the utility of individuals in the rest of
the population, by Envelope Theorem:
dV jP (y
j
P ;hgP )
dhkg
= j
@
(hP )
@hkg
8j 6= k (163)
Given (161), (162) and (163) and introducing into the equilibrium condition (158), it yields:
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Given the expected behavior in competitive markets of individuals who belong to group k (160),
equilibrium condition would be:26664ph +
k @
(hP )
@hkg
+
JP
j=1
jjj @
(hP )
@hkg
uc(ykP   phhkmP ; hkgP + hkmP )
37775 = ph (166)
This equilibrium condition holds if and only if all groups have the same ideological heterogeneity
and therefore are targeted with the same amount of cash transfers. Otherwise, in equilibrium both
parties fA;Bg must target a combination of net taxation and in-kind transfers to each group k,
(ykNP ; h
kN
gP ) for k 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8P 2 fA;Bg, such that individuals who belong to any group
k 2 f1; :::; Jg do not supplement health services in competitive markets, hkNmP = 0 8 k 2 f1; :::; Jg.
When individuals who belong to group k do not purchase health care through competitive markets
and there is public provision, by Envelope Theorem:
dV kP (y
k
P ;hgP )
dyk
= uc(y
k
P ; h
k
gP ) (167)
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dhkg
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k
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(hP )
@hkg
(168)
Furthermore, group ks health care consumption a¤ects the utility of individuals in the rest of
the population, by Envelope Theorem:
dV jP (y
j
P ;hgP )
dhkg
= j
@
(hP )
@hkg
8j 6= k (169)
Given (167), (168) and (169) and introducing into the equilibrium condition (158), it yields:
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Arranging terms, party Ps equilibrium condition when group k is targeted with in-kind trans-
fers, hkNgP > 0, and net income, y
kN
P > 0, such that individuals do not supplement health services,
hkNmP = 0, is given by:
uh(c
kN
P ; h
kN
P ) +
JX
j=1
j
k
j
k
j
@
(hNP )
@hkg
= phuc(c
kN
P ; h
kN
P ) (171)
8 k; j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8 P 2 fA;Bg; where ckNP = ykNP and hkNP = hkNgP .
C.2. Distributive Politics
The relative treatment of health services across groups is a¤ected by the presence of egalitari-
anism. From the the First Order Conditions for both political parties P 2 fA;Bg; taking (146) for
a pair of groups k and k0, in equilibrium:
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Hence, the political relative treatment in terms of health services across groups of voters is given
by: 264 kuh(ckN ; hkN )+
+
JP
j=1
j
k
jj
@
(hNP )
@hkg
375 =
264 k
0
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k0N ; hk
0N )+
+
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jj
@
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@hk0g
375 8k:k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (173)
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P and h
kN = hkNP = h
kN
gP ; and c
k0N = ck
0N
P = y
k0N
P and h
k0N = hk
0N
P = h
k0N
gP
8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg; with ykNP ; yk
0N
P > 0 and h
kN
gP ; h
k0N
gP > 0 for all P 2 fA;Bg.
52
Similarly, I can characterize the relative treatment of numeraire commodity across groups. From
the the First Order Conditions for both political parties P 2 fA;Bg;taking (145) for a pair of groups
k and k0, in equilibrium:
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Thus, the political relative treatment in terms of numeraire between elderly and non-elderly
citizens is given by:
kuc(c
kN ; hkN ) = k
0
uc(c
k0N ; hk
0N ) 8k:k0 2 f1; :::; Jg (175)
where ckN = ckNP = y
kN
P and h
kN = hkNP = h
kN
gP ; and c
k0N = ck
0N
P = y
k0N
P and h
k0N = hk
0N
P = h
k0N
gP
8k; k0 2 f1; :::; Jg; with ykNP ; yk
0N
P > 0 and h
kN
gP ; h
k0N
gP > 0 for all P 2 fA;Bg.
C.3. Allocative E¢ ciency
The rst-best problem consists of the maximization of the weighted average of individual util-
itites with group-specic Pareto weights, j , subject to the economy feasibility constraint. The
solution to this optimization problem yields the set of Pareto e¢ cient allocations:
max
fcj ;hjgJj=1
JX
j=1
jj

u(cj ; hj) + j
(h)

(176)
s.t.
JX
j=1
jcj +
JX
j=1
jqhj 
JX
j=1
jwj (177)
The FOCs for an interior optimum are given by:
[ck] kkuc = 
k 8k 2 f1; :::; Jg (178)
[hk] kkuh +
JX
j=1
jjj
d
(h)
dhk
= kq 8k; j 2 f1; :::; Jg (179)
The set of Pareto e¢ cient allocation of resources, fcjPO; hjPOgJj=1, satises (178), (179) and the
economy feasibility constraint. Furthermore, from the FOCs for consumption of the numeraire
(178) I obtain:
j
k
=
uc(c
k
PO; h
k
PO)
uc(c
j
PO; h
j
PO)
(180)
Therefore, a Pareto e¢ cient allocation of numeraire and health for group k must satisfy:
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MRSkh;c +
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jMRSj

k;cj
= MRTh;c 8k; j 2 f1; :::; Jg
In the political equilibrium, both parties, P 2 fA;Bg, announce a menu of net taxation and
in-kind transfers policies targeted to group k, (ykNP ; h
kN
gP ); such that:
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= phuc(c
kN
P ; h
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P ) (182)
8 k; j 2 f1; :::; Jg and 8 P 2 fA;Bg; where ckNP = ykNP and hkNP = hkNgP .
From the equilibrium relative treatment between groups in terms of numeraire (175) I obtain:
j
k
=
uc(c
kN ; hkN )
uc(cjN ; hjN )
k; j 2 f1; :::; Jg (183)
Introducing (176) into the equilibrium political allocation of group k (182):
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Hence, the consumption bundle of group k, (ckN ; hkN ) 8k 2 f1; :::; Jg, that results from the
political process is Pareto e¢ cient.
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